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INTRODUCTION 
When the United States government sets immigration law and policy, how much 
attention must it pay to constitutional rights? This question has been much debated 
since President Donald Trump issued a series of immigration-related executive 
orders in his first week in office, including a bar on entry by citizens of a set of 
majority-Muslim countries, but it was controversial long before then. In important 
part, the answer depends on what the Constitution says about the scope and limits of 
the power of the federal government over immigration. Therein lies the tale. On this 
subject, the country’s founding documents say very little, and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations have been inconsistent at best. 
For well over a century, federal courts have often relied on the theory that the 
immigration authority is rooted in the Constitution’s grant to the federal government 
of control over matters related to sovereignty and foreign affairs. This explanation 
forms the basis of the plenary power doctrine, first announced in 1889 and applied 
by the Supreme Court most recently in 2018.  The doctrine grants Congress and the 
executive branch nearly unreviewable powers in the immigration arena. This Article 
offers an alternative. It asserts that immigration to the United States is and has long 
been principally economic in its purpose and impact and thus in many cases is 
properly considered a function of both the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses. 
The constitutional source of a particular authority of a branch of the government does 
not wholly determine the degree of constitutional review that courts will exercise, 
but it is an important factor. An immigration power rooted in the Commerce Clause, 
the Article argues, would put a thumb on the scale in favor of ordinary judicial review 
for immigration statutes, rules, and policies challenged as violating constitutional 
rights. 
The argument that the immigration power grows from the Foreign Commerce 
Clause has a “Return of the Jedi” quality. For half of the nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court did ground the immigration power in the Constitution’s explicit 
statement that the federal government has control over commerce with foreign 
nations.1 In the mid-1800s, when immigration first became seen as a national rather 
than state issue, courts treated the federal immigration power as an ordinary function 
of the Foreign Commerce Clause and relied on this theory to sustain the federal 
government’s right to tax ships that transported newcomers to the United States. 
While plenary in the sense that it granted control over immigration to the federal 
rather than the state governments, this power appeared to be subject to ordinary 
constitutional limitations. 
This era came to an end with the Court’s announcement of the plenary power 
doctrine in the Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889.2 There, the Supreme Court declared 
that Congress and the President have a near-absolute power to control immigration, 
with the corollary that courts should be highly deferential to the political branches 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. The Commerce Clause grants this power to Congress, not to the Executive Branch. 
Later in this Article, I argue that the Executive Branch shares in this power, both because of 
its role as the enforcer of congressional policies, and because of its independent authority. See 
infra notes 197–198 and accompanying text. 
 2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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when reviewing such decisions for constitutionality.3 For over 125 years, 
intermittently, but particularly at times of peak concern about national security, the 
Supreme Court has relied on this plenary power doctrine in limiting the extent of 
constitutional review of immigration policies that facially discriminated against 
individuals on the basis of their race, nationality, political beliefs, or gender. 
In the contemporary era, the Supreme Court’s reliance on the plenary power 
doctrine has fluctuated. In a number of cases, the Court has ignored the doctrine, 
leading many scholars to predict its demise.4 In others, it has relied on it, including 
in its recent decision on President Trump’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii.5 In no 
case has the Court overruled the doctrine, or even offered an explicit critique, and 
the justices have proposed no alternative theory to take its place. Plenary power 
arguments make consistent appearances in contemporary briefs, including those filed 
by the Trump administration,6 and in lower court decisions as well.7  
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided three cases that raised issues about the 
relationship of the Constitution to immigration law.8 Despite hopes that this trilogy 
of cases would offer the Court the opportunity to articulate a consistent framework 
for its approach to constitutional review in the immigration context, the decisions 
only further muddied the waters. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court deferred a 
constitutional reckoning on the due process implications of unlimited mandatory 
detention for noncitizens pending determination of deportability.9 In Sessions v. 
Dimaya, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court reached new heights of constitutional 
oversight of Congress’s actions on immigration, for the first time striking down a 
substantive deportation ground as unconstitutional after finding that it was void for 
vagueness.10 Rather than approaching plenary power doctrine head on, the 5-4 
majority in Dimaya simply ignored it, robustly reviewing the immigration statute 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Id. at 602–03. 
 4. E.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 117–18 (2015); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255, 305; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, 
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 934 (1995). 
 5. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418–20 (2018); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003). The controlling opinion in a recent Supreme Court plurality decision 
also cited plenary power with approval. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 6. E.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 15–19, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 471 (2016) (No. 15-1204). 
 7. E.g., Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 37 (D. Mass. 2017).  
 8. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (challenging the third version of President 
Trump’s “travel ban” as a violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause); Sessions 
v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (challenging the “crime of violence” deportation ground as 
unconstitutionally vague); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (challenging the 
denial of bond hearings to noncitizens mandatorily detained for longer than six months as a 
violation of due process). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 10. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
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without referring to the doctrine.  Dimaya makes history without acknowledging that 
it does so.11 
By contrast, in Trump v. Hawaii, the most closely watched of the decisions, the 
Court relied heavily on the plenary power doctrine in upholding the third iteration of 
President Trump’s travel ban, which barred entry to most citizens of six majority-
Muslim countries, together with North Koreans and some officials from Venezuela.12 
In a 5-4 decision, it rejected arguments that the President’s Proclamation barring 
entry to the United States of citizens of mostly majority-Muslim countries, following 
his repeated promises to create a “Muslim Ban,” violated either the Immigration and 
Nationality Act or the Establishment Clause.13 Instead, the opinion cleared a broad 
path for essentially unreviewable presidential action in the immigration arena.14 
At this moment of incoherence in the relationship of immigration law to the 
Constitution, and of urgent need for clarity, this Article advances the Commerce 
Clause as the anchor of a new understanding of the relationship between the 
Constitution and immigration law and policy. Currently, the Commerce Clause plays 
almost no role in immigration jurisprudence. Despite the extensive early history of 
the Foreign Commerce Clause as the presumed source of the immigration power, 
few scholars have seriously considered its contemporary suitability for that role.15 
More strikingly, none have explored the Interstate Commerce Clause as an 
appropriate source of the immigration power and one that could open the door to a 
normalization of constitutional analysis in the immigration context.16 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the 
United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 13. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435–36 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(setting out statements made by President Trump during his campaign and while in office 
regarding the travel ban). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 2409, 2421–22. For a fuller discussion of Trump v. Hawaii, Sessions 
v. Dimaya, and Jennings v. Rodriguez, see infra Parts I, II.D.2.b. 
 15. The principal treatments of this issue are historical in focus. See, e.g., Kif Augustine-
Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 718–
721 (2005); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, 
and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743 passim (1996); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L REV. 1, 99–112 (2002); Matthew J. Lindsay, 
Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration 
Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2010). Others have suggested more briefly that 
the Foreign Commerce Clause might be an appropriate contemporary source for the 
immigration power. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 186 (1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation 
of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 864, 866 (1989); Jack M. Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2010) (arguing that his “interaction theory” of foreign 
commerce “best explains and justifies Congress’s powers over immigration.”); Gabriel J. 
Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of 
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1998). 
 16. The closest to such a discussion that I have seen is Cristina Rodríguez’s mention of 
the potential impact of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on the reformulation of 
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Given the outsized economic impact of immigration on the United States during 
the past two centuries, the absence of contemporary discussion about the relationship 
between the Commerce Clause and the immigration power comes as a surprise. 
Immigration to the United States was fundamentally an economic phenomenon at 
the nation’s founding, and the courts soon acknowledged as much by grounding it in 
the Foreign Commerce Clause. And it is fundamentally an economic phenomenon 
today.17 Most newcomers arrive in search of more, better, or higher-paying work. 
Even those admitted in noneconomic categories—as refugees, to study, to be 
reunited with relatives—are likely to seek a job soon after arrival.18 The numbers tell 
the story: currently, twenty-seven million permanent, temporary, and undocumented 
immigrants make up almost seventeen percent of the U.S. labor force, a higher 
percentage than at any other point in the nation’s history and a labor market 
participation rate far higher than natives.19 Immigrants work in rural areas, suburbs, 
and metropolises throughout the nation. 
By highlighting this longstanding aspect of immigration, and with it the 
Commerce Clause as an additional source of government power, the Article seeks to 
clear a pathway to more consistent judicial consideration of constitutional rights in 
the immigration context. Drawing on the history of the Supreme Court’s early 
immigration jurisprudence rooting the immigration power in the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, and on data demonstrating immigrants’ higher level of engagement with 
national and interstate labor markets compared to natives, and their greater interstate 
mobility in search of work,20 it argues that immigration today is fundamentally 
economic in its impact and thus properly considered a function of both the Foreign 
and Interstate Commerce Clauses. 
The consideration of the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the 
immigration power is one of the Article’s unique contributions. Changes in 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the twentieth century have extended the 
understanding of “commerce” beyond international or interstate transportation of 
goods or people to include direct regulation of individuals crossing national or state 
borders for economic reasons. Meanwhile, when the New Deal Interstate Commerce 
Clause cases expanded the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause, it, too, became 
available to ground the immigration power. 
Beginning with United States v. Lopez in 1995, the Supreme Court has sought to 
rein in Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.21 Yet, the Article contends, 
                                                                                                                 
 
the division between federal and state/local spheres of immigrant regulation. Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 
629–630 (2008). 
 17. On the economic nature of immigration in the history of the United States, see 
generally MICHAEL J. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE (1979); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY 
DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006). 
 18. Cf. ZOLBERG, supra note 17, at 14 (“In the perspective of capitalist dynamics, 
immigrants of any kind—including refugees—are considered primarily as ‘labor.’”).  
 19. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics 
Summary (May 18, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VE9V-KKJP]. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Since then, the boundaries of the Commerce Clause have 
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even the more restrictive contemporary understanding of interstate commerce leaves 
room for the Interstate Commerce Clause to encompass federal action on 
immigration. Immigrants are a central force in the United States economy. This 
Article asserts that law and policy on immigration fundamentally serves both as 
regulation of interstate commerce in the form of the national labor market and as 
regulation of individuals in interstate commerce. 
To be clear, were the Court to accept the Commerce Clause as an appropriate 
source of the modern immigration power, broader judicial review of the 
constitutionality of immigration-related laws or policies would not follow 
automatically.22 Other doctrines—such as limits on the extraterritorial application of 
the Constitution, the Court’s habitual deference in the face of the government’s 
assertion of national security concerns, and the conceptual link between sovereignty 
and immigration—seem likely to continue to cast a shadow over Supreme Court 
review of the political branches’ determinations about admission and deportation 
categories and processes. Yet an explicit recognition of the relationship between the 
Commerce Clause and the immigration power has the potential to contribute to a 
constructive reconsideration of jurisprudence regarding the constitutional norms that 
should govern immigration policies.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly traces the evolution of the plenary 
power doctrine from its introduction in the late 1800s through 2018, with particular 
attention to the Court’s ambivalence toward and frequent abdication of constitutional 
review in the immigration context. Part II turns to the Commerce Clause as an 
additional source of the immigration power. It highlights the view widely held earlier 
in the nineteenth century that immigration was commerce, which supported the 
Supreme Court’s attribution at the time of the federal government’s authority over 
immigration to the Foreign Commerce Clause. It then contends that changes in the 
jurisprudence of the Interstate Commerce Clause during the New Deal have rendered 
the Interstate Commerce Clause available as an underlying source of the 
government’s authority to make immigration laws and policies, notwithstanding 
some retrenchment on the scope of interstate commerce since the Supreme Court’s 
Lopez decision in 1995. Part III argues that both the Foreign and the Interstate 
Commerce Clauses should be understood to undergird the immigration power today 
and suggests that acknowledging immigration’s relationship to the Commerce 
                                                                                                                 
 
remained somewhat fluid, with cases such as United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 
reinforcing the limits of interstate commerce, and cases such as Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1 (2005), suggesting a return to openness. See infra Part II.B for discussion of the current legal 
landscape regarding the Interstate Commerce Clause and its implications for the immigration 
power as an outgrowth of that Clause. 
 22. The relationship between constitutional powers and constitutional rights is its own 
field, a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a sense of the scope 
of debate in this area, see Symposium, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 
GA. L. REV. 343 (1993). For my purposes, it suffices to note that the clause of the Constitution 
that grants the government a particular power influences, but is not the only determinant of 
the degree to which the Court will recognize individual constitutional rights as a constraint on 
that power. 
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Clause clears a path to more routine judicial review of immigration laws for 
constitutionality. 
I. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE 
Early in his presidency, Donald Trump asserted that the United States faced a 
crisis of national security that justified immediate Executive Branch action with 
regard to immigration.23 In a series of executive orders issued during his first weeks 
in office, President Trump followed through on his campaign promises to bar 
Muslims from entering the United States24 and to create ideological tests to screen 
would-be immigrants for American values.25 Faced with what appeared to be a policy 
of facial discrimination against immigrants on the basis of religion,26 advocates for 
and scholars of constitutional rights alike cried foul.27 Immigration scholars, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 
25, 2017) (Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States); and Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry 
into the United States). 
 24. Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Calls for Barring Muslims from 
Entering U.S., N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (Dec. 7, 2015, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banning-
muslims-from-entering-u-s [https://perma.cc/6V6M-2QS5]. 
 25. As to the President’s campaign promises, see David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, 
Donald Trump’s Terrorism Plan Mixes Cold War Concepts and Limits on Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/politics/donald-trump-
terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/3PBP-GPXP]; Christina Wilkie & Elise Foley, Donald 
Trump Proposes Ideological Test for Entry to the United States, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 
2016, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-immigration-
test_us_57b224c9e4b007c36e4fc81e [https://perma.cc/UD3M-D4RN]. As to his execution of 
those promises, see sources cited supra note 23. 
 26. For a detailed exploration of the last time a President sought to apply restrictions to 
men from predominately Muslim countries, in the wake of 9/11, and the outcome of court 
challenges to that policy, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and 
the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010); see also Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017). 
 27. When President Trump campaigned on these promises, constitutional experts 
declared that they would likely be struck down by the Supreme Court as facial violations of 
fundamental rights. E.g., Ari Melber, Constitutional Scholars: Trump’s Anti-Muslim 
Immigration Proposal Is Probably Illegal, MSNBC (Dec. 7, 2015, 10:27 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-anti-muslim-proposal-probably-illegal 
[https://perma.cc/FUT8-6H93]; Ari Melber, Legal Scholar: Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Probably 
Legal, MSNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:34 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-muslim-ban-
probably-legal [https://perma.cc/5NNU-DNHD] (quoting Lawrence Tribe: “The 
Constitution’s ‘bar against declaring an official religion’ would apply to discrimination 
against non-citizens.”); Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Director: We Will Defend the 
Constitution Against a President Trump, WASH. POST (July 13, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-president-trump-would-threaten-our-constitutional-
freedoms/2016/07/13/42b41048-4876-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html [https://perma 
.cc/F22R-MFWW]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump’s Policies Would Be Unconstitutional and 
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however, tended to be less sanguine.28 Their skepticism that the Supreme Court 
would invalidate these orders was grounded in their awareness of the longstanding 
debate about the source of the immigration power and the plenary power doctrine 
that had grown from it. 
In a federal government of enumerated powers, immigration is an exception: 
nowhere does the Constitution explicitly grant the federal government full 
immigration authority.29 There are some apparent leads—the Migration and 
Importation Clause, for example, which sounds like a fine option but in fact, most 
agree, was written with slavery and indentured servitude rather than voluntary 
immigration in mind.30 There are some partial sources, such as the Naturalization 
Clause, which are generally understood to refer only to the government’s ability to 
set rules for the granting of citizenship.31 The War Powers Clause probably includes 
the ability to regulate “enemy aliens,”32 but says nothing about the majority of 
newcomers who come from friendly nations. The best candidate for the source of an 
implied power is the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court relied on the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Will Be Challenged If Adopted, ACLU Says, ABA JOURNAL (July 14, 2016, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trumps_policies_would_be_ 
unconstitutional_and_will_be_challenged_aclu_says [https://perma.cc/GLL6-9BEY]. 
 28. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Trump’s Anti-Muslim Plan Is Awful. And Constitutional., N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-is-
awful-and-constitutional.html [https://perma.cc/AT4V-FX2S]; Melber, Legal Scholar, supra note 
27. But see Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely To Be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of 
Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org 
/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power 
[https://perma.cc/27U5-VWG5]. 
 29. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 99 (6th ed. 2015). 
 30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as 
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be 
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). Despite its opening 
wording, some scholars believe that the Importation Clause was intended only to relate to 
slavery. See, e.g., Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 
198, 214 (1968). Others see the Clause as having had a broader meaning at the time of its 
adoption, reaching white immigrants as well as slaves. See DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND 
THE COMMERCE POWER 21 (2006); Bilder, supra note 15, at 784–87. 
 31. The Naturalization Clause exclusively enables Congress to set the terms on which a 
noncitizen can gain citizenship, not temporary or permanent admission short of naturalization, 
and has nothing to say about removal. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have Power 
. . . To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 940–41 (1983) (locating the immigration power exclusively in the Naturalization Clause 
but stating that the resulting power was plenary). In a forthcoming paper, my colleagues 
Andrew Kent and Thomas Lee will offer evidence from original debates that Founders saw 
Naturalization as encompassing immigration more broadly. See E-mail from Thomas Lee, 
Professor, Fordham U. School of Law, to author (Mar. 19, 2017, 13:56 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 32. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (relating the 
immigration power to deportation in times of war or “Congressional apprehension of foreign 
or internal dangers short of war . . . .”). 
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Foreign Commerce Clause to undergird the immigration power for decades in the 
1800s.33 But given the lack of an explicit link between the two, the Court was free to 
change its mind—and did so as that century drew to a close. 
The origin story of judicial deference to the federal political branches over 
immigration has been oft-told.34 The Supreme Court articulated the plenary power 
doctrine for the first time in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion 
Case).35 The Court declared that the political branches, and particularly Congress, 
held the exclusive power to determine who could enter the United States and on what 
terms.36 Legislative action regarding the exclusion of newcomers would be subject 
to extremely limited judicial review for constitutionality.37 With no clear 
constitutional boundaries on the field, the Court established a doctrine for review of 
immigration law and policy that stood outside the mandate of Marbury v. Madison 
that “a law repugnant to the [C]onstitution is void; and that courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument.”38 
The Chinese Exclusion Case was decided at a time of positive U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations, but virulent anti-immigrant sentiment directed at Chinese 
people in the United States. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, despite the absence of 
hostilities with China, Justice Field develops an extended metaphor of immigrants as 
invaders to justify transferring the political branches’ power to manage foreign 
affairs during times of war to the control of routine immigration from a friendly 
nation during peacetime. 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign 
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. Stephen Legomsky was the first to lay out a comprehensive, case-by-case account of 
the evolution of the doctrine in his 1987 book, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY. LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 15, at 177–219. Legomsky argued that the Supreme Court had constructed the 
plenary power doctrine by leaping from the international law principle that countries have the 
right to exclude foreigners, to the assertion that U.S. constitutional law assigned the 
immigration power exclusively to the political branches of the federal government, and that 
the decisions of those branches were immune from judicial review. See id. at 184–87. 
 35. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
Chae Chan Ping, a twelve-year lawful resident of the United States, was barred from returning 
to the United States because he had failed to obtain a re-entry permit—even though the permit 
requirement had not been in place at the time of his departure. Id. at 585–86. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, this country’s first (but far from last) effort to bar immigration from a 
nation or ethnic group, was the source of this mandate. The Act was not repealed until 1943. 
Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943 (Magnuson Act), PL 78-199. Later, the Asian 
Exclusion Act, part of the Immigration Act of 1924, banned all immigration from Asian 
nations. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). Legomsky traces 
the beginning of the plenary power doctrine to the earlier line of cases invalidating state efforts 
to regulate immigration, establishing the federal government as the sole authority in that arena. 
LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 180–92. For a discussion of those cases, which relied on the 
Commerce Clause as the source of the immigration power, see infra Part II.A. 
 36. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609. 
 37. Id. at 609. 
 38. 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). 
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attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. 
It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, 
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from 
vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.39 
 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in 
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace 
and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there 
are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are 
subjects.40 
In the phrase that elevated the immigration power out of the ordinary sphere of 
checks and balances into the plenary domain, Justice Field declares that the 
legislature’s decision about who to exclude from the United States “is conclusive 
upon the judiciary.”41 
It is not surprising that there is some judicial deference to the political branches 
in the context of immigration. Despite predictions to the contrary at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the nation-state remains the foundational unit of governance 
around the globe.42 Most people instinctively feel that a sovereign country should 
have the right to establish rules about the categories and processes for immigration. 
More controversial has been the doctrine’s extent. A number of other government 
powers have been labeled “plenary” and yet remain subject to constitutional 
constraints.43 Yet the immigration plenary power doctrine has often been deployed 
by courts to insulate rules and processes regarding those who seek to enter or remain 
in the United States from most of the protections of individual rights that the 
Constitution grants in other contexts.44 The irony is acute: a government power 
tenuously rooted in the Constitution has been interpreted to grant the political 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. But see Cleveland, supra note 15, at 277–84; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 53–56; 
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (1993) 
(arguing that the sovereignty rationale for a broad plenary power is a relic of the nineteenth 
century, and no longer makes sense after the creation of a positive law structure for nations’ 
obligations in the international realm and the individual rights revolution). 
 43. For example, the War Powers and the Indian and Foreign Commerce Clauses. For 
discussion of the difference between how plenary has been interpreted in the context of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and in the immigration context, see infra notes 199–203. 
 44. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[T]his Court has firmly and repeatedly 
endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable 
if applied to citizens.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“‘Over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the 
admission of aliens.”) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 
(1909)); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever 
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”). 
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branches carte blanche to ignore constitutionally-protected rights with regard to 
immigrants and those who associate with them.45 
Within a few years of the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court had 
elaborated the federal government’s control of immigration as inherent in the rights 
of a national government to conduct foreign affairs and establish and defend its 
sovereignty.46 In a series of decisions, it extended the plenary power doctrine to the 
immigration actions of the executive branch as well as Congress, and (in a weaker 
form) to the deportation of noncitizens residing in the United States as well as the 
exclusion of those seeking admission.47 It established doctrinal distinctions still 
dominant today, for example, that judicial review will usually be more vigorous 
where noncitizens have already been admitted to the country rather than standing 
(literally or by legal fiction) outside the border,48 and where procedural rather than 
substantive rights are at stake.49 These cases set the course for the jurisprudence of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 
supra note 2, at 275. 
 46. “The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 
Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the 
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.” 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609. 
 47. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), the Supreme Court extended 
the plenary power doctrine to procedures and decisions of the California immigration 
commissioner and the (separate) federal inspector for the port of San Francisco, both acting 
via grant of authority from the federal Treasury Secretary. Id. at 662–63. This closed off most 
avenues to appeal to federal courts by noncitizens denied entry. “[T]he decisions of executive 
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due 
process of law.” Id. at 660 (emphasis added). Ekiu did, however, preserve the writ of habeas 
corpus for noncitizens who were detained by the U.S. government after being excluded. Id. 
Note that this extension of the power to both political branches goes beyond the Chinese 
Exclusion Case’s initial assignment of plenary power to Congress alone. In Fong Yue Ting, 
the Supreme Court extended the plenary power doctrine to noncitizens already admitted to the 
country. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893). 
  The executive branch plays a critical role in regulating immigration. The plenary 
power doctrine encompasses both of the political branches, and courts have been unable or 
unwilling to clarify where which aspects of the power lie. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power 
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President 
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009). The Commerce Clause, however, is explicit 
in granting the authority over commerce solely to Congress. See infra notes 205–207 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of how the executive’s current extensive role in 
immigration decision-making and standard-setting is related to the congressional immigration 
power as currently understood. A similar understanding would bring the executive branch 
under a Commerce Clause-based understanding of the immigration power. 
 48. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Immigration law uses the legal 
fiction of “standing outside the border” to distinguish those who have been legally admitted 
from those who have not. A noncitizen is referred to as “standing outside the border” whether 
she is in another country applying for a visa, actually at the border requesting admission, or 
present in the United States without having been legally admitted. 
 49. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
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the federal immigration power well into the 1970s, with sporadic reappearances 
through the twenty-first century.50 
Litigation over the relationship between immigration and the Constitution has 
waxed and waned. Immigration all but fell off the federal docket during the 
restrictionist 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s, taking the question of plenary power with it. 
When the issue returned in 1950, however, the Cold War was underway, and the 
plenary power doctrine came back in full force. The Supreme Court’s 1950 statement 
in Knauff v. Shaughnessy that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, 
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,”51 signaled the renewed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. At the outset, it is important to clarify that jurisprudence on immigrants and the 
Constitution is generally bifurcated. Although the plenary power line of cases, at issue here, 
limits judicial review for constitutionality of immigration law and policy, that is as to 
noncitizens’ right to enter and remain in the United States, a separate line of cases, dating from 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), grants immigrants—including in many cases 
undocumented immigrants—constitutional protections as to many aspects of their daily lives 
in the country. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one 
of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or 
transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. 
Id. at 77 (citations omitted). The Court emphasizes, however, that these protections do not 
extend to the context of exclusion and deportation. 
In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The 
exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible 
counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own 
citizenry. 
Id. at 79–80 (footnotes omitted). 
  So, for example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been held to encompass 
the right of noncitizen children, including undocumented children, to a free public education 
through secondary school, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and of noncitizens in criminal 
proceedings to the same Miranda warning and protection against unconstitutional searches and 
seizures enjoyed by citizens, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). For 
assessments of the extent of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1723 passim (2010). 
  The Supreme Court has, however, permitted Congress to distinguish between legal 
permanent residents and citizens in certain other contexts. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365 (1971), the Court established that state classifications based on alienage should be subject 
to strict scrutiny, id. at 372, but soon carved out an exception where the distinction was tied to 
the state’s governmental operations, permitting state discrimination against legal permanent 
residents in hiring for policing, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), and for public school 
teaching, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), among other arenas. In Mathews v. Diaz, 
moreover, the Court made clear that a lower level of scrutiny applied when examining federal 
alienage classifications created by Congress. 426 U.S. at 85–87. That case upheld a federal 
law requiring five years of continuous residence from legal permanent residents before 
qualifying for certain federal public benefits, with no such requirement for citizens. Id. at 87. 
 51. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
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vigor with which the Court would turn to the doctrine during the decades that 
followed.52 National security and foreign affairs rationales were central to decisions 
upholding actions on immigration by both the legislative and executive branches as 
the Cold War proceeded.53 
Others have amply described the impact of the plenary power doctrine over the 
past century. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that despite its 
tenuous link to an enumerated power, the doctrine has been cited by the Supreme 
Court in upholding immigration policies that openly discriminate on the basis of a 
noncitizen’s race, gender, national origin, or political views.54 Until 2018, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (Justice Frankfurter: While “much 
could be said for the view” that due process limits congressional power in the immigration 
arena “were we writing on a clean slate . . . the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power 
of Congress under review, there is not merely ‘a page of history,’ but a whole volume. Policies 
pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with 
the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive 
Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. But that the 
formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government.”) (citations omitted). 
 53. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1972) (citing national security 
concerns and the plenary power doctrine in upholding the decision of the Attorney General 
not to permit a foreign scholar with Marxist views to enter the United States to attend a 
conference); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953) (citing 
national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine in upholding as constitutional the 
indefinite detention of a legal permanent resident seeking re-admission to the United States); 
Knauff, 338 U.S. at 549–50 (citing national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine 
in upholding as constitutional the exclusion from the United States without a hearing of the 
wife of a United States citizen). 
 54.  See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The 
controlling opinion in a recent Supreme Court plurality decision also cited plenary power with 
approval. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–40 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a 
review of modern cases, see Chin, supra note 15, at 3–7; Legomsky, Immigration Law and 
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 4, at 261–69. Regarding Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), Chin argues that despite its holding the case actually represents a 
“[q]uiet [e]xpansion of [j]udicial [r]eview,” because the Court did not say that there was no 
review of Congress’s substantive categories in the immigration context, instead accepting 
“limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of 
Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens.” Chin, supra note 15, at 62–66 
(quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5). However, as Chin notes, the Court upheld Congress’s 
differential gender-based standard following “an exceedingly deferential review.” Id. at 64. 
  This is not by any means to say that noncitizens always lose in cases about 
immigration. As Stephen Legomsky observed thirty years ago, in the modern era the Court 
has not infrequently turned to liberal statutory interpretation as a way of avoiding the plenary 
power doctrine. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15 at 156–70; see also Motomura, supra note 49; 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). Kevin Johnson has 
recently argued that the Court increasingly relies on ordinary tools of statutory construction, 
including the constitutional avoidance doctrine and clear statement rules, as well as the 
application of administrative law principles, to rule in favor of immigrants. See Johnson, supra 
note 4 passim. 
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Supreme Court had never held unconstitutional a substantive criterion for admission 
or “removal” (the modern term that covers both exclusion at the border and 
deportation from the interior), whether established by Congress or the executive 
branch.55 In addition, the Court has relied on plenary power in permitting procedures 
in the immigration arena that would clearly violate the due process protections of the 
Constitution if they were applied elsewhere. These include indefinite detention on 
the basis of evidence not revealed to the noncitizen;56 removal based on an 
administrative hearing held in English at which the noncitizen—whose sole language 
was Japanese—was unrepresented, had no translator, and was unaware that the 
procedure related to her deportation;57 and indeed the removal of a noncitizen based 
                                                                                                                 
 
  Indeed, Supreme Court decisions in 2017 saw a number of immigrants prevail in 
challenges to immigration law. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (finding 
that attorney’s faulty advice regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal plea led to 
prejudice, and ruling for noncitizen); Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) 
(before the government can denaturalize a naturalized citizen on the basis of a conviction for 
misstatements on her citizenship application, it must show that the misstatements were central 
to the grant of citizenship); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (applying 
a categorical approach to the crime of statutory rape for the purposes of immigration law; 
holding that for a conviction of statutory rape to qualify as an aggravated felony, the 
underlying state law must criminalize sexual intercourse with an individual younger than 
sixteen). Consistent with Johnson’s thesis, all of these rulings were made on statutory 
interpretation grounds and did not mention plenary power. In the one immigration case where 
the Supreme Court resolved a constitutional question, Morales-Santana (discussed infra), it 
was careful to distinguish between the context where the constitutional challenge arose, which 
it characterized as relating to citizenship at birth, and the context of noncitizen admission 
categories in which greater deference is due to Congress. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 
1700–01. 
 55. The 2018 case striking a removal ground for the first time is Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 
S. Ct. 1204 (2018). In Dimaya, the Court held that one part of the definition of “crime of 
violence” as a ground for deportation as an “Aggravated Felon” was void for vagueness. Id.  
The opinion does not mention the plenary power doctrine.   
  In addition, in 2017 the Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 
(2017). There, it found that the larger burden that the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes 
on unwed U.S. citizen fathers versus mothers in order to pass citizenship to their children was 
a violation of Equal Protection. Id. at 1700–01. In so doing, the Court explicitly sidestepped 
the question of the vitality of the plenary power doctrine. It distinguished the question 
presented as related to a claim of citizenship on birth, rather than an “entry preference for 
aliens” that might have triggered the need for maximal judicial deference that plenary power 
mandates in considering constitutional challenges to immigration. Id. at 1693. 
 56. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 206. 
 57. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Ironically, Yamataya is a case remembered 
for acknowledging some procedural rights in the deportation context, because it required a 
sliver of opportunity for the immigrant to be heard in administrative proceedings. This 
standard was found to be met when Ms. Yamataya, who spoke no English, was granted a 
hearing at which she was not provided a translator and did not realize that the proceedings 
related to her deportation. Id. at 90. “If the appellant’s want of knowledge of the English 
language put her at some disadvantage . . . that was her misfortune, and constitutes no reason, 
under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the intervention of the court by habeas 
corpus.” Id. at 102. 
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on a hearing held in absentia or without any hearing at all.58 When, in the wake of 
9/11, the executive branch required that all men from predominately Muslim 
countries in the United States on temporary visas register with the government, the 
initiative was upheld by every circuit court that considered constitutional challenges 
to it.59 As a number of scholars have pointed out, in addition to its consequences for 
immigrants, the plenary power doctrine limits citizens’ ability to exercise their 
constitutional rights.60  
Plenary power has been roundly critiqued by academics and advocates who see it 
as an unwarranted exception to baseline constitutional protections, born of an era of 
xenophobia and racism.61 As to the source of the power, scholars have particularly 
emphasized the weak constitutional soil in which the Court rooted the doctrine when 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012) (repealed 1996); Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 
333 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Another example of a diminished constitutional safeguard in a 
deportation hearing, and most significant to the present case, is that an immigration judge may 
deport an alien in absentia based on the existing record.”). 
 59. For a review of these decisions, see CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT PENN STATE’S 
DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SECURE 
ITS BORDERS 22–23 (2009), http://www.adc.org/fileadmin/ADC/Pdfs/nseerspaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EW86-MBYL]; see also Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security 
Law?, supra note 26. 
 60. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (Justice Scalia for the plurality: a citizen 
has no liberty right in being reunited with her noncitizen spouse, and therefore there is no 
process due to her that would require notice of why her husband’s visa was denied); 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (declining to balance U.S. citizen professors’ 
asserted First Amendment right to engage with the views of a noncitizen professor whose visa 
was denied, against Congress’s plenary power over immigration; requiring that the U.S. 
government provide only a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its denial of the visa); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (although the Court there claimed it did carry 
out constitutional review on this issue, it did so with extreme deference to Congress, and 
ultimately held that citizens’ rights were not infringed). But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392, 2416–17 (2018), where the majority finds that U.S. citizens have standing to challenge 
the President’s travel ban because they have a cognizable interest in being reunited with their 
relatives, before holding against the plaintiffs on the merits. See also Justice Kennedy’s 
controlling concurrence in Kerry v. Din, where he assumes without deciding that U.S. citizens 
have a liberty interest in being reunited with a noncitizen spouse or other relatives abroad, but 
finds that right not infringed by the U.S. government policy of giving no further information 
when a visa is denied on terrorism grounds by a consular authority. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion, see NEUMAN, supra note 50, at 138 
(mentioning as examples citizens’ First Amendment rights when denied the opportunity to 
hear from and interact with the noncitizen); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: 
Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57. See also LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS 
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 69–93 
(1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in 
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 
531 (2000).  The decision in Trump v. Hawaii has again raised these concerns. See, e.g., Leah 
Litman, Opinion, Unchecked Power Is Still Dangerous No Matter What the Court Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/travel-ban-hawaii-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/FN7N-SYY3]. 
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it turned away from the enumerated powers to foreign affairs and sovereignty 
rationales.62 
One such critique emphasizes that if the foreign affairs power is to be relied on 
across the board as a source of the immigration power, it must be justified by 
reference to the centrality of international relations to most immigration decisions 
made by the executive and legislative branches.63 Indeed, some small number of 
immigration determinations do have the potential to influence the United States’ 
standing with other nations. A decision to refuse a visa to a foreign official, for 
example, or to create additional requirements for entry for citizens of a country with 
which the United States is in conflict, may provoke a reaction from the government 
of the affected country.64 But today, the vast majority of immigration laws and 
procedures, and the decisions made under them, are routine, set out criteria that apply 
to nationals of all countries, and at least ostensibly reflect considerations unrelated 
to foreign relations, such as the individual’s impact on the public health, her criminal 
record, the likelihood she will become a public charge, and whether her presence will 
deprive U.S. workers of employment. While relationships with individual nations 
may receive outsized attention when they arise in the immigration context, in fact 
they affect a miniscule percentage of immigration law and its application.65 Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia has made a similar argument regarding the limited nexus 
between genuine national security concerns and most of immigration law.66 
More broadly, a number of scholars outside the immigration arena have sought to 
undermine the assumption that the political branches’ foreign affairs power itself lies 
beyond the realm of constitutional protections.67 Control over foreign affairs is only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Note, however, that foreign affairs was already present as an explicit rationale in 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 
(1876). The principle concern about foreign affairs at that time seems to have been that one 
state could end up disrupting the country’s relationship with another country. “If it be 
otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other 
nations.” Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280. 
 63. For variations on this argument see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 160–62 (2002); 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 
4, at 261–69; Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law”, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179 
(2016); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 53; NEUMAN, supra note 50, at 135–38; David S. Rubenstein 
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 615–16 
(2017). But see David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 38–42 (2015) (arguing that the foreign affairs rationale remains a valid 
justification for a diminished level of judicial review of immigration policies in some 
instances). 
 64. One example of this is the retaliatory action the Brazilian government took against 
U.S. citizens seeking to enter Brazil when the United States refused to allow Brazilians to 
enter without a visa. See C.S., You’re Not Welcome, ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/02/tourist-visas [https://perma.cc/XC6W-LC5A]. 
 65. See sources cited supra note 63. 
 66. Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, supra note 26. 
 67. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (with responses in the Harvard Law Review Forum by 
Carlos Vázquez, Curtis A. Bradley, and Stephen I. Vladeck); see also Abrams, supra note 47, 
2018] IMMIGRATION AS COMMERCE  669 
 
implied from the Constitution, rather than explicitly set forth in it.68 Nonetheless, 
during the years from the Supreme Court’s 1936 United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.69 decision through the end of the Cold War, the Court interpreted the 
power expansively, permitting the executive to use it to insulate a wide range of 
actions from meaningful constitutional review. In The Normalization of Foreign 
Relations Law, Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth have recently argued that the 
Supreme Court has now entered a new “normalized” phase of construction of the 
foreign affairs power, with a turn to more ordinary review.70 When the Court 
considers immigration cases, however, this normalization is not evident. 
Sovereignty has been separately critiqued as a basis for the immigration power. 
Some scholars have questioned the notion of sovereignty as a modern rationale for a 
number of government powers, arguing that it is rooted in an outdated nineteenth 
century territorial conception of what it means to be a nation-state.71 It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to resolve the debate about the contemporary relevance of 
sovereignty to immigration policy. Instead, it proceeds on the pragmatic view that 
arguments about the demise of sovereignty are unlikely to meet a warm reception in 
the federal courts. With that assumption in mind, one response might be to accept the 
relationship between sovereignty and immigration, while contesting the exemption 
that plenary power grants the government from constitutional constraints. But such 
an approach faces an uphill battle, in that its demand for constitutional rights will 
always be taken up in the shadow cast by the tradition of deference that accompanies 
sovereignty justifications. In response, this Article calls for a doctrinal 
counterweight: an additional constitutional source for the immigration power, on 
which judges and litigants can draw as a reminder that most immigration laws and 
policies have quotidian rather than grand aims, and should receive an ordinary 
measure of constitutional review. 
With some major exceptions, including Trump v. Hawaii in 2018, in recent years 
plenary power has appeared to be in decline.72 A number of Supreme Court decisions 
have veered away from applying a plenary power analysis, albeit without overruling 
the doctrine. In 2015, Kevin Johnson argued that although the Supreme Court had 
announced no move to change the doctrine, in practice it now sought to resolve most 
                                                                                                                 
 
at 635–36. Most recently, in his forthcoming book, Martin Flaherty critiques the idea of 
judicial deference to the executive in the realm of foreign affairs as a “newcomer to the legal 
landscape,” and argues for a no-deference standard. MARTIN FLAHERTY, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the author). 
 68. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1972). 
 69. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 70. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 67. 
 71. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 184–86; Cleveland, supra note 15, at 99–112; Lindsay, 
supra note 15. 
 72. The case most responsible for this theory was Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 
decided just a few months before 9/11, in which the Court applied the constitutional avoidance 
canon to justify reading a six-month limit into a statutory provision authorizing unlimited 
detention of noncitizens who are excludable, removable, or a flight risk. Following 9/11, 
however, the door appeared to close. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Nonetheless, 
since then, the Court has only occasionally referred to plenary power or cited the Chinese 
Exclusion Case and its fellows, even when it has appeared to apply the doctrine. 
670 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:653 
 
immigration cases that raise a combination of constitutional, statutory interpretation, 
and administrative law questions by avoiding the constitutional issues, consistent 
with the constitutional avoidance canon.73 Instead, it used the ordinary tools of 
statutory construction and assessment of the scope of the agency’s exercise of its 
discretion to resolve the case.74 He concluded that “[i]mmigration exceptionalism—
and, with it, the Chinese Exclusion Case—after 125 years appears to slowly but 
surely be on its way out.”75  
Others at the time were less optimistic, pointing to recurring instances since 9/11 
when the Supreme Court applied the plenary power doctrine.76 In 2003, the Supreme 
Court relied on plenary power to uphold a statute mandating detention for classes of 
noncitizens prior to determination of their deportability.77 In 2015, the Supreme 
Court upheld a State Department policy of providing minimal explanation to a 
noncitizen whose visa application is denied by a consular official in a plurality 
opinion in Kerry v. Din,78 with several justices explicitly citing the doctrine.79   
In its 2018 decisions on immigration and the Constitution, the Supreme Court did 
little to clarify its approach to the plenary power doctrine.  Indeed, it deepened the 
confusion by ignoring the doctrine in one case while applying it in another, without 
making any effort to reconcile its approaches.  In Sessions v. Dimaya,80 the Court 
acted consistently with the view that plenary power is on the wane by striking down 
a substantive deportation ground as void for vagueness, with no reference to a 
diminished standard of constitutional review in immigration cases.81 In Trump v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Johnson, supra note 4, at 61–65. See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 156–170; 
Motomura, supra note 55; Motomura, supra note 49. 
 74. Johnson, supra note 4, at 61–65. 
 75. Id. at 118; see also Lindsay, supra note 63, at 241; Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra 
note 63. But see Kevin Johnson, No Decision in Two Immigration Enforcement Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-decision-
two-immigration-enforcement-cases [https://perma.cc/8Q3M-5HUN] (noting uncertainty 
about the direction the Court will take following its 2017 decision to postpone decisions in 
two cases challenging the constitutionality of aspects of immigration law). 
 76. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015) (“A sober observer would point out that 
immigration law scholars have been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power 
doctrine for at least three decades.” (citing Legomsky, supra note 4, at 305)); Lindsay, supra 
note 15, at 8 (“Although the Supreme Court in recent decades has muted some of the more 
severe aspects of the plenary power doctrine, the constitutional exceptionalism of the 
immigration power, as well as its core legal rationale, remain fundamentally intact.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 77. Demore, 538 U.S. at 521. 
 78. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
 79. Id. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This case is used as a jumping off point to 
argue that the plenary power doctrine is being dismantled as to procedural challenges but 
preserved as to substantive constitutional rights. See Kagan, supra note 76. Kagan notes that 
although “recent case law has significantly weakened the doctrine,” the Supreme Court “may 
be hesitant to discard the doctrine entirely.” Id. at 23. 
 80. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 81. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  
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Hawaii,82 by contrast, the Court applied a minimalist standard of constitutional 
review to uphold the President’s travel ban against an Establishment Clause 
challenge, citing core plenary power cases with approval.83  
The Court may have split the baby in this way because Dimaya dealt with a 
provision for the deportation of noncitizens already admitted to the country, a posture 
in which plenary power has been weakened, while Hawaii was about measures to 
exclude would-be entrants and arose in a context where the government claimed 
national security was at stake, two settings where plenary power is at its strongest.84 
But the justices themselves offered no such explanation.  In light of the 2018 
retirement of Justice Kennedy, and the probability that his replacement will cement 
a conservative majority on the Court, the plenary power doctrine now seems more 
likely to regain prominence than to quietly disappear. 
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A SOURCE OF THE IMMIGRATION POWER 
It has been well over a century since the Supreme Court last held that the federal 
immigration power was rooted in the Foreign Commerce Clause. The Interstate 
Commerce Clause has never been seriously considered for this role. Yet today, taken 
together, they offer an additional framework for the federal immigration power, one 
that is directly rooted in the Constitution and that sets the stage for a more robust 
standard of judicial review. 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”85 Each element of the clause has been interpreted as giving rise to a distinct 
form of the power, with its own evolution over time. In addition, a fourth “negative” 
or “dormant” Commerce Clause has been derived from this language, rendering a 
state or local law as unconstitutional when it unduly burdens interstate commerce. 
Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden86 in 1824, the Commerce Clause has been 
understood as governing a broad swath of economic activity, although the precise 
contours of the commerce power have been interpreted differently over time. This 
section briefly traces the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, argues for 
locating the immigration power in the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses, and 
contends that adoption of this view would facilitate more robust judicial review of 
immigration laws and policies for constitutionality. 
A. The Lost Source: The Foreign Commerce Clause 
From early in the nation’s history, it was understood that the Commerce Clause 
permitted the federal government to control certain aspects of immigration—those 
that were analogous to international trade in commercial goods—with the states 
retaining all other authority under their police powers.87 Underpinning this view of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 83. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.  
 84. See infra note 271. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 86. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 87. Id. at 196–97; Abrams, supra note 47, at 611 n.41 (citing NEUMAN, supra note 50, at 
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the federal power was the concept that human beings could be characterized as 
“articles of commerce,” and therefore that their transportation across national borders 
fell under federal purview. This assertion was first made regarding the importation 
of slaves and indentured servants in the days after the founding of the United States.88 
The initial consensus that people were properly considered articles of commerce 
fell apart in the mid-1800s.89 The dispute was not generated by immigration. With 
important exceptions, the general attitude in the country in the mid-1800s was pro-
immigration: even as Irish and Asian immigrants faced rampant xenophobia,90 
newcomers were recruited for their labor—if not always made welcome on arrival—
in a growing nation with ample space.91 Instead, it originated with the national 
conflict over slavery. If immigrants were articles of commerce, then so too were 
slaves—and if so, Congress could ban the domestic slave trade under its Commerce 
Clause authority.92 As conflict over slavery between the North and South gained 
intensity, southern states and slave owners fought this interpretation. Mary Sarah 
Bilder, in her history of this period, notes the profound irony of lawyers for the pro-
                                                                                                                 
 
138); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 6, 13. For an overview of this question, see Erin F. Delaney, 
In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws 
Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2007). 
 88. Bilder, supra note 15, at 761. 
 89. Id. at 748 (“[T]his assumption—that persons entering from abroad were ‘articles of 
commerce’—became one of the most disputed questions of constitutional law.”). 
An important question is whether considering people as commerce fundamentally 
commodifies human beings, demeaning their dignity, denying their agency, and masking their 
noneconomic reasons for migrating. This is especially problematic given that the pre-Chinese 
Exclusion Case jurisprudence rooting the immigration power in the Foreign Commerce Clause 
and arguing for people as commerce really was about pacifying the South and permitting 
southern states to continue denying entrance to free blacks. In focusing on economic concerns, 
does this proposal obscure the frankly racist basis of much U.S. immigration policy? See Chin, 
supra note 15, at 29 (“Mass immigration . . . was not the problem; Chinese represented a 
fraction of total immigration. Moreover, labor competition from white aliens was not 
criticized.”). See also quotes from multiple legislators expressing white supremacist views as 
a basis for exclusion in this context, for example Chin quotes Senator Teller during the debate 
over the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 as saying “‘[t]he Caucasian race has a right, 
considering its superiority of intellectual force and mental vigor, to look down upon every 
other branch of the human family. . . . We are superior to the Chinese.’” Id. at 31. 
  I take these questions seriously. Yet on balance, I have concluded that, even given 
that terrible history, locating the immigration power in the Commerce Clause is a better fit and 
reflects more respect for immigrant dignity and agency than the current rooting of the power 
in foreign affairs and national security, which implicitly or explicitly sees every immigrant 
through a lens of “enemy alien,” invasion, and terrorist threat. 
 90. Chin, supra note 15, at 20; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
 91. TONY ALLEN FREYER, THE PASSENGER CASES AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: 
IMMIGRANTS, BLACKS, AND STATES’ RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 109–110 (2014); 
Lindsay, supra note 15, at 11. 
 92. One example of such an argument can be seen in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 
(1841), a case regarding the validity of Mississippi constitution’s prohibition on the 
importation of slaves. As Bilder points out, although the Supreme Court avoided explicit 
decision about whether slaves were articles of commerce, the case was “argued as a case about 
commerce.” Bilder, supra note 15, at 808. 
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slavery camp accusing abolitionists of demeaning slaves as “chattels” by 
categorizing them as articles of commerce.93 
As it navigated this conflict, the Supreme Court continued to assert the federal 
government’s power over the transportation of immigrants as a function of the 
Commerce Clause. For the bulk of the nineteenth century, most efforts to regulate 
immigration occurred on a state level, and were limited to weeding out those seen as 
criminal, sick, or unable to support themselves—or to funding their care—rather than 
to reducing immigration numbers as a whole.94 The regulated parties generally were 
not individual immigrants, but the merchants who brought them into the country.95 
Most of these state initiatives efforts sought to impose per-passenger fees and 
reporting requirements on ships arriving from overseas and docking at a port in the 
state. 
In the cases that arose from challenges to these policies, the Supreme Court made 
clear that it saw the foreign commerce power as the explicit source of the federal 
government’s authority over the transportation of immigrants.96 The seaboard states 
justified their head taxes and related reporting requirements as a way to assess the 
needs of newcomers and to pay for their care and support.97 Shipmasters argued that 
the states’ actions represented efforts to control foreign commerce, a power which 
lay exclusively with the federal government.98 The Supreme Court sometimes 
rejected these Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, as it did in Miln in 1837, 
permitting New York’s reporting requirement to stand as an exercise of the state’s 
police power.99 It sometimes upheld them, as with the 1849 Passenger Cases, where 
the Court struck down New York and Massachusetts head tax laws as 
unconstitutional because they usurped the federal commerce power.100 Either way, 
what the justices debated was the distribution of power over immigration between 
the states under their police powers and the federal government under its foreign 
commerce power. Despite debate among the justices, shifting majorities consistently 
reached the conclusion that the federal authority over immigration derived from the 
Foreign Commerce Clause. 
When the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court left behind any hesitation about 
explicitly rooting the federal government’s immigration power in the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.101 After Congress passed an 1875 immigration statute, one of its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. The attorney for Mississippi argued that slaves were persons not commerce and 
decried abolitionists who would reduce them to “chattels.” The opposing anti-slavery 
attorneys were forced to argue that slaves are articles of commerce in order to gain federal 
regulation. Bilder, supra note 15, at 807–09. 
 94. See Lindsay, supra note 15, at 13. 
 95. “Consistent with the belief that immigration involved a commerce, regulation did not 
focus on the people entering, but on the merchants who imported them.” Bilder, supra note 
15, at 772. 
 96. Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 
36 U.S. 102 (1837); FREYER, supra note 91, at 73; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 13, 19. 
 97. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 284; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 17. 
 98. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 288; Miln, 36 U.S. at 107. 
 99. 36 U.S. at 102. 
 100. 48 U.S. at 283. 
 101. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 
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earliest efforts to regulate immigration on a national level, the Supreme Court struck 
down New York, California, and Louisiana statutes regulating shipmasters bringing 
newcomers to those seaboard states under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis that 
reiterated the Foreign Commerce Clause as the source of an exclusive federal 
authority over the transportation of immigrants.102 In Henderson v. Mayor of New 
York,103 the Supreme Court explicitly held that immigration was commerce with 
foreign nations.104 In Chy Lung v. Freeman,105 the Court invalidated a California law 
limiting and taxing immigration to the state, arguing that  
[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and 
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to 
the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: 
the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the 
manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government.”106 
                                                                                                                 
 
U.S. 275 (1876). See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) for discussion of how 
almost all Commerce Clause cases were Dormant Commerce Clause cases until 1887. For the 
importance of the distinction between the federalism cases and the immigrants’ rights cases, 
see Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 63. 
  “Only after the Reconstruction Amendments formally barred people from actually 
being held as potential articles of commerce under slavery or involuntary servitude could the 
Court accept that immigrants were ‘articles of commerce.’” Bilder, supra note 15, at 823. 
 102. 92 U.S. at 259. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The Henderson Court states that during the time passed since the holding in Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), that navigation was commerce.  
[T]he transportation of passengers from European ports to those of the United 
States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that 
time to other branches of commerce. It has become a part of our commerce with 
foreign nations, of vast interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who 
come among us to find a welcome and a home within our borders. In addition to 
the wealth which some of them bring, they bring still more largely the labor 
which we need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent resources 
of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and its agriculture. Is the 
regulation of this great system a regulation of commerce? Can it be doubted that 
a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels shall engage in it is a law 
regulating this branch of commerce?  
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270–71. Answering this rhetorical question in the affirmative: “A law 
or a rule emanating from any lawful authority, which prescribes terms or conditions on which 
alone the vessel can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of 
vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign 
nations.” Id. at 271. 
 105. 92 U.S. 275. 
 106. Id. at 280. As the last sentence quoted in the text indicates, the Court emphasizes the 
political rather than economic implications of permitting states to regulate immigration, akin 
more to the foreign affairs power that the Court would later cite in the Chinese Exclusion Case 
than to the Commerce Clause.  
If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign 
nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon 
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Undergirding this conclusion was the understanding that the transportation of 
immigrants to the United States was foreign commerce of great economic importance 
to the country.107 Congress’s immigration power grew from the right to regulate such 
commerce, as well as its power over foreign affairs.108 
All of these cases were challenges to state action in the immigration arena. It was 
not until 1884 that the Supreme Court was called upon to affirmatively rule on a 
challenge to the federal immigration power, again in the context of a law imposing 
taxes and other responsibilities on shipmasters. In the Head Money Cases,109 which 
involved a challenge to the federal Immigration Act of 1882,110 taxing the 
transporters of immigrants at fifty cents per head, the Court unanimously upheld the 
law on the grounds that it was a valid exercise of the government’s immigration 
authority, explicitly granted by the Foreign Commerce Clause.111 In support of its 
                                                                                                                 
 
herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as 
to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the 
general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it 
does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible? 
Id. Kerry Abrams traces the relationship between these cases and the contemporary Supreme 
Court decisions on whether state legislation regarding immigrants are preempted by the federal 
immigration power. Abrams, supra note 47. 
 107. See Lindsay, supra note 15, at 23. The transportation of European immigrants to the 
United States has “attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that time 
to other branches of commerce.” Id. at 24 (quoting Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270). The reference 
is to when Gibbons was decided about fifty years earlier, declaring that laws on navigation 
constituted regulation of foreign commerce. See id. “In addition to the wealth which some of 
[the European immigrants] bring, they bring still more largely the labor which we need to till 
our soil, build our railroads and develop the latent resources of the country.” Id. at 25 (quoting 
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270). 
 108. Regarding foreign affairs, see id. at 24–25 (quoting Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273). 
But as Mary Sarah Bilder and others have argued, for the Supreme Court to hold that the 
Commerce Clause covered the movement of human beings as well as goods across borders 
was complicated by far more than definitional issues. See Bilder, supra note 15. 
 109. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 110. The Act taxed the arrival of noncitizens at a U.S. port at fifty cents a head, declaring 
that  
[t]he money thus collected shall be paid into the United States Treasury, and shall 
constitute a fund to be called the immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the expense of regulating 
immigration under this act, and for the care of immigrants arriving in the United 
States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes and 
expenses of carrying this act into effect.  
Id. at 589–90 (citing the Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (1882)). 
 111. Id. at 591 (“We are now asked to decide that [the immigration power] does not exist 
in Congress, which is to hold that it does not exist at all—that the framers of the Constitution 
have so worded that remarkable instrument, that the ships of all nations, including our own, 
can, without restraint or regulation, deposit here, if they find it to their interest to do so, the 
entire European population of criminals, paupers, and diseased persons, without making any 
provision to preserve them from starvation, and its concomitant sufferings, even for the first 
few days after they have left the vessel.”). See also Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 719; 
Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57. 
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finding that the immigration “power does reside in Congress, [and] is conferred upon 
that body by the express language of the Constitution,”112 the Court cited its Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis in the earlier state immigration law cases.113 The opinion 
states that immigration laws “are regulations of commerce—of commerce with 
foreign nations,” and they “constitute a regulation of that class which belongs 
exclusively to Congress . . . .”114 If the federal immigration power is rooted in the 
Commerce Clause for the purposes of preempting state action, the Court reasoned, 
that same source grants the federal government the sole power to regulate 
affirmatively in the field.115 The Head Money Cases are not remembered for this 
holding, which was uncontroversial at the time. Instead, they are recalled as striking 
a new balance between state and federal control over immigration, one that strongly 
favored the federal government.116 
The course of immigration jurisprudence changed only five years later, however, 
when a Court with just two new members took an uncharted path.117 In the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, a case about individual constitutional rights rather than immigration 
federalism, Justice Field’s opinion for a unanimous Court sets out the plenary power 
doctrine described in Part II, rooting immigration not in the Commerce Clause but in 
the nation’s sovereignty and authority over its foreign affairs.118 In his entire Chinese 
Exclusion Case opinion, Justice Field cites the Head Money Cases but one time, and 
for an aspect of the holding unrelated to the source of the immigration power.119 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. Head Money Cases, 122 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. at 591–93. 
 114. Id. at 591, 595 (“[T]he power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The 
burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of 
commerce—of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration.”). 
 115. Most recently, the Dormant Commerce Clause has been raised in the context of 
challenges to state efforts to limit the rights of immigrants in Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia, 
among other states, in the first decade of the 2000s. For a discussion of the blurring of lines 
between the plenary power doctrine and immigration preemption, see Abrams, supra note 47, 
at 617–18. 
 116. See FREYER, supra note 91, at 144–45; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 28. Note that the 
debate had important implications for the parallel debate about slavery and state versus federal 
power in that context. FREYER, supra note 91, at 56. 
 117. Between the Head Money Cases and the Chinese Exclusion Case, Chief Justice 
Morrison Waite and Associate Justice William Woods left the Court and were replaced by 
Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Associate Justice Lucius Lamar II. The seven associate 
justices who remained on the Court during this period joined the unanimous opinions in both 
cases. 
  While the view I present here—that the emergence of the plenary power doctrine 
represented a break with past jurisprudence, reflecting and motivated by a rise in anti-Chinese 
sentiment—is widely shared, it is not without dissenters. See, e.g., E-mail from Thomas Lee, 
supra note 31. 
 118. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 119.  
The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately 
considered in The Head Money Cases, and it was there adjudged “that so far as 
a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject 
of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as 
Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”  
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Foreign Commerce Clause also appears only once in the opinion, as part of a grab-
bag list of federal powers relevant to relations with other countries.120 Interstate 
commerce is mentioned a single time, in a similarly broad recital of aspects of 
internal governance.121 Neither is claimed as a source for plenary power. 
Justice Field offers no explanation for the Court’s abandonment of the Commerce 
Clause as the primary source of the immigration power, and few commentators have 
explored the question. One exception is Matthew Lindsay, who has argued that the 
shift came about due to transformations taking place in the U.S. political economy 
and in perceptions of immigration at the time.122 He contends that the motivation had 
little to do with changing interpretations of the Constitution; rather, “the plenary 
power doctrine was borne of an urgent sense of national peril”123 which recast the 
arrival of newcomers as a foreign invasion rather than an economic benefit, and that 
                                                                                                                 
 
Id. at 600 (quoting the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)). 
 120. Id. at 604 (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel 
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit 
subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise 
only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, 
more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”) (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 605 (“It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and 
sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require 
uniformity of regulations and laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies, 
the postal system, patent and copyright laws, the public lands and interstate commerce, all 
which subjects are expressly or impliedly prohibited to the state governments.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 122. Lindsay, supra note 15. My colleague, Tom Lee, suggests that the shift may, instead, 
have been due to the fact that the Chinese Exclusion Acts represented the first affirmative 
federal immigration statutes to exclude a group of people based on nationality or race, since 
prior immigration was principally from Europe and regulated by treaty and state taxes on 
persons transported as in the Head Money Cases. Because the Chinese Exclusion Case was 
the first time the Court faced this new question, and because—as he and my colleague Andrew 
Kent argue in a forthcoming article—plenary power was “part of the original DNA” of the 
Constitution, Lee argues that the Court’s initiation of the plenary power doctrine did not 
represent a change of course, but rather the first exercise of a dormant but inherent sovereign 
power to exclude entry to territory long recognized under the law of nations. E-mail from 
Thomas Lee, supra note 31. 
 123. Lindsay, supra note 15, at 6 (Lindsay goes on to point out “most contemporary 
policymakers, judges, and scholars would reject” the terms on which the sense of peril was 
based); see also id. at 621–22 (arguing that the rise of modern immigration exceptionalism 
lies “more fundamentally in an urgent and pervasive discourse of national self-preservation 
that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.”). This is key to his payoff, which is that 
the slate of plenary power is not clean: 
[T]he ‘slate’ of the American immigration power is in fact a palimpsest of 
anachronisms: alien invasions, existential threats to the republic, and simple 
racism. If the plenary power doctrine is going to survive into the future . . . it 
should at the very least be on grounds that today’s policymakers and judges 
recognize as legitimate and intellectually coherent. 
Id. at 646. 
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the Supreme Court unleashed the plenary power doctrine in order to free the political 
branches to defend against it.124 
Many scholars have argued that racism and xenophobia were a driving force 
behind the Supreme Court’s shift in doctrine.125 This Article posits that another factor 
was working in tandem. Both state and federal immigration legislation prior to the 
Chinese Exclusion Act governed the transportation entities that brought immigrants 
to the United States, rather than regulating immigrants individually.126 This fit 
squarely within the Court’s understanding of foreign commerce as related to trade 
and navigation. The Chinese Exclusion Act broke with this tradition by directly 
restricting the immigration rights of individuals of a particular country, without 
reference to intermediaries. Although the opinion gives no hint as to why the Court 
moved away from the traditional Foreign Commerce Clause grounding of the 
immigration power, some of the impetus may have come from this new approach in 
the Act. Since the challenged statute represented the first time that Congress had 
directly sought to exclude a particular racial or ethnic group, the Court was free (and 
perhaps felt obliged) to find a different basis in the Constitution for this aspect of the 
federal immigration authority. 
Despite its turn away from commerce, the Chinese Exclusion Case evidences a 
strong concern about the economic impact of immigration. Even as Justice Field cuts 
the immigration power free from the Commerce Clause, he identifies the problem at 
the core of Chinese immigration as a domestic economic one rather than an issue of 
politics or foreign relations. He states that Chinese people in the United States 
were generally industrious and frugal. Not being accompanied by 
families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and they 
were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our 
laborers and artisans. The competition between them and our people was 
for this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation, 
proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many cases, by open 
conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public peace. The differences of 
race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.127 
It was this particularly toxic combination of racism and competition for jobs that set 
the table for the announcement of the plenary power doctrine. 
Following the Chinese Exclusion Case and its companions, the Supreme Court 
sometimes mentioned the Foreign Commerce Clause in passing as a kind of backup 
for the plenary power doctrine, either alone or among other possible sources for the 
immigration power. But with one exception, none of these subsequent holdings 
ultimately relied on the Foreign Commerce Clause as the source of the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Id. at 596, 621. 
 125. Chin, supra note 15; see sources cited supra note 61. 
 126. Note that the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 did purport to regulate the immigration 
rights of individual noncitizens, but were never enforced and—with the exception of the Alien 
Enemies Act (now codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2012))—were allowed to expire within 
three years of their passage.  J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1402, 1406–07 (1992). 
 127. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
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immigration power. Instead, they cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny, 
with their emphasis on sovereignty and foreign affairs, as the source of the plenary 
power doctrine. 
That single outlier, Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,128 provides 
strong support for the theory advanced here that the Court’s shift from the Commerce 
Clause to the plenary power doctrine in the Chinese Exclusion Case came about in 
part because the Commerce Clause at the time was seen to allow the federal 
government to govern the commercial transportation of immigrants, but not the right 
of individual immigrants to enter and remain. The one time that congressional action 
after the Chinese Exclusion Case led to a Supreme Court challenge by a shipping 
company, rather than an individual, the Court reverted to its earlier Commerce 
Clause theory. 
In 1903, Congress passed the Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the 
United States.129 Responding to growing concern about the role of anarchists in the 
United States and the recent assassination of President McKinley, the Act created 
new categories of deportable and excludable noncitizens and penalized shipmasters 
for bringing noncitizens to the United States who were ineligible to enter.130 The 
Act’s constitutionality was twice challenged before the Supreme Court. First, in 
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, an anarchist found deportable under the Act 
asserted that its provisions were invalid because it infringed on his free speech and 
due process rights.131 The Court’s refusal to consider whether the immigration law 
violated the Constitution was by then unsurprising. In rejecting Turner’s individual 
claims, the Court hedged its bets. It cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and subsequent 
plenary power holdings, relying on sovereignty rationale, but also “the power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes the entrance of ships, the 
importation of goods, and the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States,” 
in concluding that “the act before us is not open to constitutional objection.”132 
Five years later, the same law was challenged by the Oceanic Steam Navigation 
Company, which had been fined under the law for passengers who arrived with 
contagious diseases that barred them from entry. The company contended that such 
a penalty was beyond Congress’s powers to impose under the Constitution. In 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the Court rejected the navigation firm’s 
arguments without ever citing the Chinese Exclusion Case and later plenary power 
decisions, or so much as mentioning the foreign affairs or national sovereignty 
rationales that for the prior two decades had undergirded the strong version of 
Congress’s plenary immigration power.133 Instead, faced with a case about the 
transportation of immigrants, it turned back to the Foreign Commerce Clause.134 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 
 129. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903). 
 130. Id. §§ 2, 4. 
 131. See 194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
 132. Id. at 290. 
 133. See Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. 320.  For an insightful discussion of Oceanic Steam’s 
reliance on the Federal Commerce Clause as the source of the immigration power, and of the 
relationship of the case to the plenary power doctrine, see Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, 
720–21. 
 134. Several cases in lower or administrative courts in the years following Oceanic Steam 
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opinion characterized immigration as functionally the same as trade: the Act’s 
validity rested on the assertion that: 
no individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations, which is so 
broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to 
determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this 
country and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised.135 
Relying on this authority, the Court upheld the Act despite its admission that in 
another field its provisions might raise troubling constitutional issues.136 The most 
quoted line of the Oceanic Steam opinion states that “over no conceivable subject is 
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” immigration.137 In 
so holding, the Court imported the new assumption of plenary power into the old line 
of cases based on the Commerce Clause.138 
In one sense, Oceanic Steam offers hope for the argument advanced here, because 
it points to the continued viability of the Foreign Commerce Clause as a basis for the 
immigration power. But it also signals its potential limitations. If the relationship 
between the Commerce Clause and the federal immigration authority requires the 
regulation of a commercial transportation entity, then this would pose a serious 
obstacle to the argument that federal statutes establishing the terms on which 
                                                                                                                 
 
reiterated the tie between foreign commerce and the immigration power, without relying on 
the statement in upholding a congressional act regarding immigration. Such cases generally 
did not cite the Chinese Exclusion Case, referring instead exclusively to prior holdings that 
the immigration power was rooted in the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. App. 350, 374 (1927), aff’d, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding 
Congress’s imposition of a flexible tariff on foreign nations: “In Henderson v. Mayor of New 
York, 92 U.S. 259, and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 344 (1909), 
the regulation of foreign immigration was held to be within the congressional power to 
regulate commerce.”). 
 135. Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335. 
 136. See id. at 338. The Act barred the entry into the United States of foreigners with 
contagious diseases, and imposed on each shipmaster the duty to inspect the health of his 
passengers and provide a report to the immigration inspection officer at the port of docking. 
Immigration Act of 1903 § 12. 
 137. Id. at 339.  
As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States 
embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject . . . it follows that the 
constitutional right of Congress to enact such legislation is the sole measure by 
which its validity is to be determined by the courts. 
Id. at 340.  
In effect, all the contentions pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of 
the statute to the due process clause really disregarded the complete and absolute 
power of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals. . . . These 
conclusions are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of Congress as to the 
admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose the 
penalty . . . . 
Id. at 343. 
 138.  Like the Chinese Exclusion Case, the opinion refers to the immigration power as 
“plenary.” Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 343. 
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individuals may enter and remain in the United States (rather than those targeting 
transportation entities) are authorized by the Foreign Commerce Clause. Of equal 
concern is the standard of review. If the Court in Oceanic Steam could ground 
Congress’s immigration authority in the Foreign Commerce Clause and yet describe 
it as virtually unlimited, perhaps the Clause provides as little protection from 
legislative overreaching as do foreign affairs and national sovereignty.139 
The Article addresses both of these concerns below, noting in Part II.B that the 
Commerce Clause now is understood to encompass individuals moving across 
foreign and interstate borders, not just those who transport them, and arguing in Part 
III.B that the understanding of Foreign Commerce Clause plenary power has been 
limited so that it does permit meaningful judicial review. Meanwhile, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause offers an additional response to both challenges. During the New 
Deal, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the requirement that an activity involve 
actual transportation across state lines in order to fall within the ambit of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. And the Interstate Commerce Clause has never been 
held to immunize congressional action from constitutional review. What, then, of the 
relationship between immigration and the Interstate Commerce Clause? 
B. A New Source: The Interstate Commerce Clause 
It is not surprising that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century courts gave no 
serious consideration to the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the 
immigration power.140 The interpretation of interstate commerce that held sway at 
the time was a limited one. Through the 1800s, interstate commerce was understood 
in constrained terms, as principally justifying Congress’s regulation of the 
transportation of goods between states for the purpose of sale. Several Supreme 
Court cases at the end of that century narrowed the understanding of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause further.141 During the New Deal, however, one case on domestic 
labor migration and a cluster of others on the scope of federal regulation authorized 
by the Interstate Commerce Clause opened the door to the argument that internal 
migration is within the ambit of the Commerce Clause. 
The Modern Jurisprudence of the Interstate Commerce Clause 
In 1941, the Supreme Court in Edwards v. California stated with confidence that 
it was “settled beyond question” that the transportation of persons between states was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. See discussion of this question infra Part III.B. On the other hand, Oceanic Steam is 
a muddled case. Without mentioning plenary power or the cases that established it, it grafts 
the blanket exception from judicial review that was only justified by plenary power’s reference 
to sovereignty and foreign affairs onto the Commerce Clause, which had not previously been 
deployed to justify a carve out from ordinary standards of constitutional review. 
 140. But note that in the context of slavery, there was serious debate about whether 
interstate commerce included the movement of slaves across state borders. See LIGHTNER, 
supra note 30; see also Bilder, supra note 15. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that 
manufacturing is not interstate commerce). 
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interstate commerce.142 This assertion rested on the affirmative resolution of the 
Supreme Court debate outlined above over whether people could be commerce in the 
context of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Like the early Foreign Commerce Clause 
immigration cases, Edwards—which challenged California’s prosecution of a man 
for driving his unemployed brother-in-law into the state—was about whether 
Congress could regulate the act of moving others across state or national borders.143 
This is consistent with early understandings of commerce as related to trade, 
navigation, or transportation. To be relevant to the regulation of immigrants 
themselves, rather than only to the intermediaries who transported them, however, 
the Court had to reject this literal understanding of interstate commerce.144 
It was not until the New Deal that the Supreme Court made plain that actual 
transportation of persons or articles of commerce across borders was not necessary 
for an economic activity to be covered by the Commerce Clause.145 To be sure, a few 
cases in the early 1900s had hinted at this possibility.146 But at the same time that it 
made these limited exceptions, the Court continued to reject efforts by Congress to 
set standards for commercial activity such as mining and manufacturing on the 
grounds that the standards would be applied to work that took place in a local area 
rather than to the movement of products between states.147 
The Supreme Court decisively severed its definition of interstate commerce from 
literal interstate transportation of goods or people in a series of cases in the 1940s. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (essentially 
stating the same thing in 1824). 
 143. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160. 
 144. Ilya Somin states “[t]he Commerce Clause also gives Congress the power to regulate 
interstate as well as international commerce. Yet almost no one at the time of the Founding 
believed that Congress therefore had the power to forbid Americans from moving from one 
state to another.” Ilya Somin, Yes, Obama’s Executive Action Deferring Deportation for 
Millions of Immigrants Is Constitutional, REASON (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://reason.com/archives/2016/04/19/yes-obamas-executive-action-deferring-de 
[https://perma.cc/2H2U-KN96]. But Annie Chan notes, with reference to Chy Lung and the 
Head Money Cases, “[f]inding immigration power within Congress’ foreign commerce power 
dovetailed with the view at the time that domestic commerce power encompassed authority 
over the migration of persons across state lines.” Annie M. Chan, Community and the 
Constitution: A Re-Assessment of the Roots of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 491, 535 
(1996) (citing Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent 
Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1603 (1959)). 
 145. But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (indicating that the Commerce 
Clause was understood as very broad from the beginning: “At the beginning Chief Justice 
Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. He made 
emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective 
restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes.” 
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). 
 146. See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375 (1905) (holding that Congress properly drew on its interstate commerce authority when it 
permitted regulation of the local meat market under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because local 
business can affect the interstate movement of goods and services). 
 147. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (manufacturing is not 
“commerce”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal mining is not 
“commerce”). 
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United States v. Darby, which upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, represented an 
important step in this direction.148 The Act established a national minimum wage, as 
well as other workplace protections, and prohibited the shipment across state borders 
of goods produced in violation of the Act.149 As to the part of the Act related to 
transportation, the Court’s holding was relatively uncontroversial. “While 
manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce,” the Court held, “the shipment of 
manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such 
shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”150 Where Darby 
broke new ground was by holding that federal regulation under the Commerce Clause 
could set nation-wide standards for the conditions of production. Noting that the lack 
of a federal minimum wage allows firms in states with low pay and poor working 
standards to compete unfairly with firms in other states that hold employers to a 
higher standard, the Court held that Congress also had the power to “regulate 
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”151 
This “substantial effect” test marked the outer limits of Interstate Commerce Clause 
doctrine to that point in the nation’s history. 
A year later, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine further, holding that an 
impact on interstate commerce could be demonstrated via aggregate noncommercial 
activity. In Wickard v. Filburn, Ohio farmer Filburn challenged a federal regulation 
that required him to pay a penalty for the amount of wheat he grew in excess of the 
allotment given to him by the federal government, even though he raised it in part 
for his own use on the farm.152 Filburn contended that a limit on a farmer’s production 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 149. Id. at 100. 
 150. Id. at 113. In so holding, the Court defined interstate commerce to 
embrace[] at least the case where an employer engaged . . . in the manufacture 
and shipment of goods in filling orders of extrastate customers, manufactures his 
product with the intent or expectation that according to the normal course of his 
business all or some part of it will be selected for shipment to those customers. 
Id. at 117. 
 151. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).  
The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective 
the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should 
not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced 
under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the 
commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows. The motive 
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative 
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and 
over which the courts are given no control. . . . . Whatever their motive and 
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional 
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the 
Commerce Clause. 
Id. at 115. 
 152. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The allotment was calculated under the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act; the penalty in question was imposed by a 1941 amendment to the Act. See 
id. at 113. 
  The Act explicitly regulated not only wheat produced for sale, but that intended to 
feed animals that would then be sold or otherwise exchanged. Id. at 118–19 (citing the Act). 
684 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:653 
 
for his use alone could not be justified as flowing from the constitutional clause 
authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce.153 The Court was not 
persuaded. Although any individual’s wheat grown for home use might have a 
minimal impact on commerce, it held, in aggregate with many others the effect could 
be substantial.154 In the wake of Wickard, conservative justices and commentators in 
particular have expressed the concern that if the aggregation of private noneconomic 
activity can meet the standard for “affecting interstate commerce,” Congress could 
regulate almost anything—including “quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck 
suppers throughout the 50 States,”155 in the words of Justice Clarence Thomas—
under its commerce power.156 
                                                                                                                 
 
Mr. Filburn’s principal business seems to have been the sale of milk, poultry, and eggs from 
his own cows and chickens, but he also grew a relatively small amount of wheat, some of 
which he sold and some of which he used as seed for the next crop, animal feed, and the 
making of flour for his family. Id. at 114. “The intended disposition of the crop here involved 
has not been expressly stated.” Id. The challenge was based on the (unstated) portion of the 
crop intended for consumption on Filburn’s farm, not the part intended for sale. 
 153. See id. at 119. The farmer’s case raised a question beyond that answered in Darby, 
because the Act “extend[ed] federal regulation to production not intended in any part for 
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Id. at 118. The case also challenged the 
Act on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, which were discussed and dismissed elsewhere 
in the opinion. See id. at 129–31. 
 154. See id. at 128. A farmer could use his own wheat to “forestall resort to the market by 
producing to meet his own needs.” Id. at 127. In other words, “[h]ome-grown wheat . . . 
competes with wheat in commerce.” Id. at 128. Taken in total, the Court argued, “[i]t can 
hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would 
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.” Id. 
This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the 
market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check 
price increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of 
the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the 
open market. 
Id. “[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it 
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce . . . .” Id. at 125. 
 155. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 69 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas’s dissent 
is in line with calls from conservative commentators who have decried the broad scope of 
federal power permitted by the New Deal cases. See, e.g., David Forte, Commerce, Commerce, 
Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of the Commerce Clause, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 18, 
2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/commerce-commerce-everywhere-
the-uses-and-abuses-of-the-commerce-clause [https://perma.cc/WBC5-KJGG] (urging 
Congress to join the Supreme Court in reining in the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause). 
 156. One additional development in the 1960s is worth note. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. 294 (1964), commonly known as the “Ollie’s Barbecue” case, the Supreme Court 
faced a private restaurant that openly discriminated against African Americans. Such 
discrimination in privately-owned public accommodation had been barred in 1964 by 
Congress through Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 294. The Court upheld the Act against 
the restaurant’s challenge, making clear that it saw the protection of human dignity in 
commerce as part of Congress’s constitutional mandate, even without considering the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In support of this view, Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Heart 
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Within the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has retrenched somewhat on the 
scope of the authority granted to the federal government through the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that an attempt by 
Congress to ban the possession of guns in school zones exceeded congressional 
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause,157 reining in the commerce power for 
the first time since the New Deal. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
distinguished the law at issue, a criminal statute, from Congress’s restrictions on 
home-grown wheat at issue in Wickard. He characterizes Wickard as “perhaps the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,” 
but states that it still “involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a 
gun in a school zone does not.”158 
In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist offers three options for congressional action that 
could be authorized by the Interstate Commerce Clause: regulation of “the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce,”159 “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
or persons or things in interstate commerce,”160 or, finally, “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”161 The law at issue in Lopez fell only in the 
third category. Although the briefs and dissenting justices presented empirical 
evidence of the aggregate impact of guns in school zones on educational opportunity, 
arguing that the damage to the national economy and productivity was substantial,162 
Justice Rehnquist dismisses those arguments as too attenuated.163 He identifies the 
target of the regulation as noneconomic, noncommercial, purely criminal activity.164 
If aggregation of this sort activates Congress’s power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause, he states, “it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.”165 The regulation of firearms on school grounds, 
he concludes, does not meet the test.166 
                                                                                                                 
 
of Atlanta noted that 
[t]he Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental 
object of Title II was to vindicate “the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” At the same time, 
however, it noted that such an objective has been and could be readily achieved 
“by congressional action based on the commerce power of the Constitution.” 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (citing S. REP. NO. 88-
872, at 16–17 (1964)). See also Justice Goldberg’s concurrence, linking Congress’s authority 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause to the power to pass a statute affecting “the vindication 
of human dignity and not mere economics.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). His concurrence also applied to Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964), with which Heart of Atlanta Motel was consolidated. 
 157. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 158. Id. at 560. 
 159. Id. at 558. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 559. 
 162. Id. at 563–64. 
 163. Id. at 563–67. 
 164. Id. at 560, 567. 
 165. Id. at 564. 
 166. Id. at 561. 
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Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court used a similar rationale 
to strike down a private right of action for domestic violence under the Violence 
Against Women Act.167 Again, in Morrison, the parties and dissents presented 
statistics demonstrating the impact on the national economy from violent attacks on 
women, seeking to demonstrate a substantial effect on commerce.168 Again, Justice 
Rehnquist held that noneconomic activities such as violence against a particular 
group could not be aggregated to reach a level of impact on interstate commerce that 
justified Congress’s intervention.169 Justice Rehnquist particularly emphasized the 
need to be vigilant about the reach of the Commerce Clause in order to avoid the 
federal government encroaching on the traditional spheres of state autonomy.170 
In Gonzalez v. Raich, however, the Court returned to the Wickard standard 
permitting aggregation of economic activity—including activity that on its face was 
private and noncommercial.171 In Raich, a case about medical marijuana, the question 
was whether Congress’s Controlled Substances Act, which criminalized the 
possession of marijuana, could override California’s statute permitting the seriously 
ill to grow and use marijuana pursuant to a valid prescription.172 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens approvingly cited Wickard’s holding that “‘even if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may 
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce.’”173 Reasoning that the local use had a meaningful 
effect on the interstate commercial market for marijuana, the Court noted that an 
individual marijuana patch was much like wheat grown for personal use.174 It rejected 
the argument that medical marijuana fell outside the national market for the drug. 
“We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When 
Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market, it may regulate the entire class.”175 The situation fell within Congress’s 
power to regulate local “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”176 
The Court emphasized, however, that its decision to permit the Controlled 
Substances Act to override California’s regulation of medical marijuana rested in 
part on the extensiveness and coherence of the federal regulatory scheme.177 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 168. See id. at 631–34 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 617. 
 170. Id. at 644. 
 171. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 172. Id. at 1. 
 173. Id. at 17 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). 
 174. Id. at 15. 
 175. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).  
 176. Id. The Court has since held that all aspects of drug dealing affect the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. See Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2016). 
 177. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26–27 (“[T]he subdivided class of activities defined by the Court 
of Appeals [that is, medical marijuana, the part that plaintiffs argued was not related to 
commerce] was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”). 
One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide 
exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated 
for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and 
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III. THE ARGUMENT FOR ROOTING THE IMMIGRATION POWER IN THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE TODAY  
A. Immigration as an Economic Activity 
Most immigration to the United States is economic in motivation and impact. The 
majority of immigrants come to the United States in search of better economic 
opportunities, and their presence is felt in local, state, and national job markets. In 
2015, there were twenty-six million immigrants in the United States labor force, 
representing 16.7% of all workers in the country.178 This is the highest percentage of 
foreign-born individuals in the workforce since the U.S. Census Bureau began 
collecting such data.179 In certain industries, the percentage is even higher. Twenty-
eight percent of construction workers,180 31% of accommodation workers,181 and 
71% of crop workers are foreign-born.182 In particular localities and occupations, 
                                                                                                                 
 
family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this 
extraordinarily popular substance. 
Id. at 28. 
  No discussion of contemporary Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence is 
complete without mention of Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012), 
regarding the lawfulness of the Affordable Care Act, in which a majority of Justices agreed 
that the individual health insurance mandate of that Act was invalid because the Commerce 
Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate economic inactivity. The Article does not focus 
here on Sebelius because it is less relevant for the Article’s argument than Lopez, Morrison, 
and Raich. 
 178. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 19. 
 179. Daniel White, Foreign-Born Workforce at Two Decade High, TIME (May 20, 2016), 
http://time.com/4343274/foreign-born-labor-data-2015 [https://perma.cc/5K35-CZWF]. In 
1970, immigrants made up 5% of the population and 5% of the labor force; by 2010 they were 
13% of the population and 16% of the labor force. See P’SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON., 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 2 (2012), 
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_ 
Workers_Brookings.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VLY-TQXS]. 
  The percentage of immigrations as a proportion of the total population is approaching 
the historic highs of nearly 15% at the turn of the nineteenth century. See BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, supra note 19, at 3. In absolute numbers, the country has never seen numbers of 
foreign-born residents remotely approaching that of the past decade. In 1920, for example, at 
the end of the Golden Era, the foreign-born population stood at 13.9 million; in 2010, it was 
forty million. Id. 
 180. NAHB Economics, Immigrant Workers in the Construction Labor Force, 
HOUSINGECONOMICS.COM (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.nahbclassic.org/ 
generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=241345&channelID=311 [https://perma.cc/ 
9ZV3-QFBL]. 
 181. P’SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON., supra note 178, at 5. Accommodation workers include 
hotel maids and janitors. 
 182. Immigration and the Rural Workforce, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/immigration-and-the-rural-workforce.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2LQR-Z463]. 
 In specific, immigrant-heavy states and/or occupations, the percentage of immigrants is 
considerably higher. See, e.g., Christian González-Rivera, Where Immigrant New Yorkers Go 
688 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:653 
 
immigrant concentrations are even higher: for example, almost 74% of young Silicon 
Valley computer and mathematical workers,183 and between 77–91% of less-skilled 
construction workers in New York City, depending on their trade, are immigrants.184 
To be clear, a relatively small proportion of permanent residents are actually 
admitted to the United States on the basis of employment.185 Temporary visas 
permitting the holder to work in the United States are much more common.186 But 
whatever the category through which they enter—including as refugees, as family 
members of U.S. permanent residents or citizens, or without authorization187—
                                                                                                                 
 
to Work, CTR. FOR AN URBAN FUTURE (Oct. 2016), https://nycfuture.org/data/immigrant-
workers-data-brief [https://perma.cc/M98T-CNAS] (analyzing concentration of immigrants in 
a range of occupations within New York City). While immigrants are disproportionately 
represented in the service industries that are less of an obvious fit with the traditional definition 
of interstate commerce, more than three quarters of them work outside the service sector in 
industries ranging from commercial agriculture that put goods in the stream of interstate 
commerce to manufacturing. Seventeen percent of the foreign-born workforce is in the 
manufacturing sector. Elizabeth Grieco & Brian Ray, Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. Labor 
Force, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
article/mexican-immigrants-us-labor-force [https://perma.cc/EF2A-5CMF]. 
 183. Press Release, Joint Venture Silicon Valley, Joint Venture Silicon Valley’s Annual 
Economic Study Shows Bay Area Hard Pressed to Handle Continuing Prosperity, (Feb. 10, 
2016), http://www.jointventure.org/2016-index-news-release [https://perma.cc/W4W4-JK7N]. 
 184. González-Rivera, supra note 182. 
 185. In fiscal year 2015, approximately 137,893 individuals were admitted to permanent 
residence through the employment-based categories. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, TABLE 6. 
PERSONS OBTAINING LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND MAJOR CLASS OF 
ADMISSION: FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2016, (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2016/table6 [. 
 186. A reliable recent analysis places the number of temporary work visas issued in 2013 
at 1.42 million. Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary Foreign Workers by the 
Numbers: New Estimates by Visa Classification, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-new-estimates-
by-visa-classification [https://perma.cc/X9S8-2A35]. 
 187. In fiscal year 2016, the last for which statistics are available, the Department of 
Homeland Security reports that the United States admitted 1,183,505 immigrants to permanent 
residence in the following categories: 
Immediate Relatives: 566,706 
Family-sponsored: 238,087 
Employment-based: 137,893 
Refugee: 120,216 
Asylee: 37,209 
“Diversity” lottery: 49,865 
(fewer than thirty thousand via other categories) 
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 185. 
  In 2013 (the most recent for which analysts have complete data), approximately 1.42 
million noncitizens entered the United States on temporary visas primarily granted for work 
purposes. COSTA & ROSENBAUM, supra note 186.The authors note that this represents 
approximately 1% of the U.S. work force. 
  Finally, the Pew Charitable Trust estimates that 350,000 undocumented immigrants 
entered the United States in 2015. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), 
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almost all immigrants in the United States are denied access to public benefits and 
must seek employment in order to support themselves and their dependents.188 
Immigrants participate in the labor force at rates higher than their native counterparts: 
they make up 13% of the total population but nearly 17% of workers. They are also 
unusually economically active as entrepreneurs and small-business owners, 
launching new enterprises at twice the rate of the native born.189 From the perspective 
of many foreign governments in immigrant-origin countries, meanwhile, remittances 
from emigrants working in the United States are a major source of GDP.190 
The Supreme Court itself has not infrequently referenced control of the domestic 
job market as an important purpose of and justification for immigration regulation, 
including with regard to aspects of immigration law that make no mention of 
employment.191 
B. The Foreign Commerce Clause Argument 
In many ways, then, immigration is a prototypical economic activity with both 
domestic and international impact. But under a contemporary understanding of the 
Commerce Clause, is immigration commerce? 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-immigrant-population-
stable-for-half-a-decade [https://perma.cc/RSU4-Z2MX]. Pew estimates the total 
undocumented population in 2015 at 11.1 million. Jens Manual Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & 
D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27, 
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-
in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/875V-NWQ9]. 
 188. In broad strokes: with the exception of refugees, all legal permanent residents are 
ineligible for means-tested federal benefits for five years after admission. Temporary 
immigrants and undocumented immigrants are barred from almost all federal benefits. For a 
detailed overview of these rules, see TANYA BRODER, AVIDEH MOUSSAVIAN & JONATHAN 
BLAZER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS (Dec. 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overview-
immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZB-VWXC]. President Trump has 
suggested that he will tighten these restrictions further. See Draft Executive Orders on 
Immigration, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/draft-
executive-orders-on-immigration/2315 [https://perma.cc/9SJD-FZK4]. 
 189. EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WELCOMING 
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS (Sept. 8, 2015). 
 190. WORLD BANK GROUP, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2016 (2016), 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/ 
4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9BW-M5X4]. “Migrants are 
now sending earnings back to their families in developing countries at levels above US$441 
billion, a figure three times the volume of official aid flows.” Id. at iv. “In 2015, the top 
recipient countries of recorded remittances were India, China, the Philippines, Mexico, and 
France. As a share of GDP, however, smaller countries such as Tajikistan (42 percent), the 
Kyrgyz Republic (30 percent), Nepal (29 percent), Tonga (28 percent), and Moldova (26 
percent) were the largest recipients.” Id. at v–vi. Worldwide, “[t]he United States is by far the 
largest [source of remittances], with an estimated $ 56.3 billion in recorded outflows in 2014.” 
Id. at vi. 
 191. See infra Part III.D.2. 
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At first glance, the Foreign Commerce Clause seems to be a more obvious modern 
source of the immigration power than its domestic counterpart. Today, it is not 
uncommon for federal courts to note that the immigration power “derives from 
various sources,”192 including the Foreign Commerce Clause.193 While this recital 
has a rote quality, as it is rarely accompanied by an affirmative argument that the 
Commerce Clause does or should undergird the immigration power,194 it would not 
be difficult to make such an assertion.195 Immigration is the movement of people 
from other countries into the United States, where most will work. It is of critical 
economic importance to many foreign governments because of the remittances 
migrants send home from the United States, and to this country because of its reliance 
on immigrants to fill particular categories of jobs in both low- and high-wage sectors. 
The prior line of cases tying the immigration power to foreign commerce remains 
available to draw on, having never been explicitly rejected by the Court.196 
Recognizing the relationship between foreign commerce and immigration would 
not, however, clear the field of obstacles. As a preliminary matter, the Commerce 
Clause grants power only to Congress, not the executive branch. As Adam Cox and 
Cristina Rodriguez point out in their article, The President and Immigration Law, the 
Supreme Court has at times stated that the executive has inherent authority over 
immigration, independent of Congress.197 If rooting the immigration authority in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). 
 193. See, e.g., id. (“Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various 
sources, including the Federal Government’s . . . power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations’”); Korab v. Fink, 797 F. 3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2012). For an examination of the very 
few instances in which federal courts mention the Interstate Commerce Clause in relation to 
the immigration power, see infra Part III.C.2. 
 194. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991, 991 n.4 (D. Ariz. 2010), 
aff’d 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 567 U.S. 387 
(2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court 
has consistently ruled that the federal government has broad and exclusive authority to regulate 
immigration, supported by both enumerated and implied constitutional powers. . . . A variety 
of enumerated powers implicate the federal government’s long-recognized immigration 
power, including the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and the Migration and 
Importation Clause.”) (citing relevant constitutional provisions, Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 
130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889)). 
 195. Several scholars touch on the idea as a part of broader analyses, including LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 15, at 186; Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 866 (“The power to regulate the admission 
and residence of aliens may be securely located in the commerce power or implied from a 
structural analysis of the Constitution.”); Balkin, supra note 15, at 26–27 (comparing the 
commerce power to the naturalization power: “But there is a far more obvious source of the 
power to regulate the flow of populations across the nation’s borders. It is the commerce power 
. . . . The eighteenth-century definition of commerce as ‘intercourse’ or ‘exchange’ among 
different peoples easily encompasses immigration and emigration of populations for any 
purpose, whether economic or noneconomic.”); Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57. 
 196. See supra Part III.A. 
 197. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 47, at 462–63. The existence of the President’s 
independent immigration authority is reinforced by two major instances the authors recount in 
which the President has acted inconsistently with congressional instructions, and that action 
has either been unchallenged or been upheld by the Court. Id. at 483–528. 
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Commerce Clause would facilitate greater judicial review of legislative but not 
presidential action, a critical part of immigration policy would be left behind under 
the plenary power doctrine, providing no answer to pressing questions about the 
legality of presidential actions on immigration. 
The simplest response to this concern is to note that, in contemporary times, the 
executive is granted most of its immigration power by statute. Cox and Rodriguez 
observe that this delegated authority is extensive: among other elements, it includes 
prosecutorial discretion to decide whether or not to pursue the deportation of 
noncitizens within the categories for removal established by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which the authors estimate to affect about a third of the noncitizens 
present in the United States.198 Were the Commerce Clause to be understood as the 
source of the immigration power, federal courts could review the constitutionality of 
Congress’s instructions, and then of the President’s actions pursuant to them. 
An equally critical concern is whether re-rooting the immigration power in the 
Foreign Commerce Clause with the goal of granting immigrants greater access to 
constitutional rights would merely trade one plenary power for another. In Gibbons 
v. Ogden, Justice Marshall famously states that the Commerce Clause power, “like 
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.”199 This oft-quoted line appears to assert plenary status for 
congressional action under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
The cases that link the immigration power to the Foreign Commerce Clause are 
of little help in grasping the appropriate standard of review. They are over a century 
old, with no real judicial consideration of the question in the interim. They are also 
inconsistent. In two immigration cases just before and after the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, both based on the assumption that the federal immigration power derived from 
the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court considered this question and 
reached opposing conclusions. 
In Chew Heong v. United States, decided in 1884, the Supreme Court approached 
the interpretation of an act of Congress related to immigration as it would have any 
other legislation at the time.200 Like the Chinese Exclusion Case five years later, 
Chew Heong challenged aspects of the Chinese Exclusion Act as in violation of an 
1880 treaty through which the United States promised Chinese citizens present 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. Id. at 463–65. Cox and Rodriguez argue that about a third of noncitizens present in 
the United States fall within a deportation category and can be removed at the discretion of 
the President. Id. at 463. They describe this as an ex post screening system that “operates as a 
substitute for front-end policymaking power; both are possible methods of achieving a 
particular size and composition of immigrants.” Id. at 464. 
 199. 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824). 
 200. 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884). In Chew Heong, the underlying statute was the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act and its amendments in 1884, and the challenged provision was its 
requirement of a certificate of reentry for Chinese noncitizens who had departed the United 
States but had been in the country prior to the passage of the Act and now sought to return, 
including Chew Heong. Id. at 536–37. This was prior to the 1888 amendments to the Act, at 
issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which voided all such certificates. Chew Heong had been 
outside the country when the requirement arose, and thus was not able to obtain the required 
certificate. Id. 
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before the Act the ability to “go and come of their own free will.”201 In the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, Justice Field would dismiss this treaty as irrelevant, invalidated by 
the Act’s subsequent passage.202 For Justice Harlan, however, considering the 
question at a time when the federal immigration power was still understood to be 
derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Court had an obligation to read 
Congress’s later action as consistent with the treaty, thus requiring that Chew Heong 
be permitted to return to the United States. Justice Harlan characterized Congress’s 
use of the immigration power in this instance as a potential threat to sovereignty—
not an exercise of it as in the Chinese Exclusion Case—unless it could be limited by 
the courts.203 
In Oceanic Steam Navigation v. Stranahan,204 decided twenty years after the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court takes a different position.205 In that case, a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a federal immigration statute, addressed in more 
depth above, does not mention the Chinese Exclusion Case, foreign affairs, or the 
matter of sovereignty. It discusses the immigration power solely as a derivative of 
the Foreign Commerce Clause. And yet, it repeatedly says that Congress’s power 
over immigration is “absolute” and “plenary.”206 Oceanic Steam, not the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, provides the oft-cited assertion regarding immigration that “over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.”207 Relying 
on Oceanic Steam, Kif Augustine-Adams has thus argued that “[g]rounding the 
power to exclude aliens in the Foreign Commerce Clause, rather than in sovereignty, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. Immigration Treaty of 1880, China-U.S., art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. The 
language from the treaty is quoted in Chew Heong at 542. For discussion of Chew Heong, see 
Lindsay, supra note 15, at 29–31. 
 202. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
 203. Lindsay, supra note 15, at 31. “Notwithstanding its expansive scope . . . the federal 
immigration power of the 1870s and 1880s remained a creature of and subject to the U.S. 
Constitution.” Id. at 23. 
 204. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 
 205. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 719–21. “In sum, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has limited congressional power under the Domestic Commerce Clause, but that 
case law does not address the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719. “Even when 
recognizing the Foreign Commerce Clause as a basis for congressional control over 
immigration, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the Bill of Rights to a noncitizen’s claim 
to remain in the United States.” Id. at 719–20 (citing Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 
(1904)). In Turner, the Court relies on the Chinese Exclusion Case in rejecting a challenge to 
a federal statute excluding and deporting noncitizen anarchists, saying that Congress’s 
decision was “not open to constitutional objection,” and says that it would have reached same 
result under Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. Turner, 194 U.S. at 290. 
 206. E.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 214 U.S. at 343 (“[T]he plenary power of 
Congress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose 
the penalty . . . .”). 
 207. Id. at 339. Furthering this concern, see, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Servs., 758 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1985): “Although in the present case 
the INS acts pursuant to the immigration clause of Article I, § 9 rather than the Commerce 
Clause, congressional authority under both clauses is plenary.” (citation omitted to Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)—although that case does not, in fact, mention 
commerce.). 
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may be a starting point for applying constitutional protections in immigration law. It 
is not, however, an entirely clean beginning.”208 
Nonetheless, most other scholars who have considered the question offer a more 
optimistic assessment of the standard of constitutional review that would attend a 
renewed link between the Foreign Commerce Clause and the immigration power.209 
Cases outside the immigration arena make clear that Congress’s actions under the 
foreign commerce power are subject to constitutional review. The sweep of the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the question is typified by its assertion in 
Buckley v. Valeo210 that “Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has 
substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not 
offend some other constitutional restriction.”211 Justice Marshall, of course, says the 
same with specific reference to the Commerce Clause in the Gibbons quote above, 
holding Congress’s power to legislate under that clause “acknowledges no 
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”212 This line of cases offers 
support for the claims by Alexander Aleinikoff, Jack Chin, Sarah Cleveland, and 
others, that while the foreign commerce power may be plenary, it is still subject to 
baseline constitutional constraints—and would remain so even in the immigration 
context.213 
C. The Interstate Commerce Clause Argument 
1. Immigration in Relation to Modern Interstate Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
The argument that the regulation of immigration falls within the ambit of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause has barely been made by litigants or courts, much less 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 721. She elaborates: “While there may be no 
question that the Bill of Rights limits Congress’ authority under the Domestic Commerce 
Clause, the answer is far from clear with respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719. 
 209. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 866 (acknowledging that “the commerce power 
has been labeled ‘plenary.’ . . . [But] [e]liminating the talk of sovereignty and inherent power 
[present in the immigration plenary power doctrine] ought to help decision makers recognize 
that the immigration power does not stand above or before the Constitution.”); Chin, supra 
note 15, at 56–57 (“Because there is no question that the commerce authority is limited by the 
Bill of Rights, if the Court reverted to its original theory of immigration power, constitutional 
immigration law would be brought in to the mainstream.”); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 55 
(“Recasting the federal immigration power as but one instance of Congress’s ‘plenary’ power 
to regulate commerce, for example, would carry with it a presumption that regulations of 
immigrants and immigration are subject to the same substantive, judicially enforceable 
constitutional norms as most other federal laws . . . .”). 
 210. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 211. Id. at 132 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). 
 212. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (emphasis added). 
 213. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 15, at 279 (“Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the federal 
commerce power has been recognized as ‘plenary,’ at least with respect to federal-state 
relations. Yet Congress may not constitutionally exercise its authority under the commerce 
power to discriminate overtly on the basis of race, to deny basic First Amendment rights, or 
to violate other fundamental constitutional protections which are routinely waived in 
immigration cases.”); see also Lindsay, supra note 15, at 55. 
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gained traction. Despite the door that Darby and Wickard would seem to have opened 
to understanding immigration as a part of interstate commerce, not a single federal 
circuit court case since they were decided cites them for that purpose. Academics 
have been similarly silent. Like courts, although scholars and advocates have amply 
criticized the origins and impact of the plenary power doctrine, and some academics 
in passing have argued for consideration of the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source 
of the immigration power,214 none have contended that the Interstate Commerce 
Clause should stand alone or alongside the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of 
the immigration power. 
If this argument was not made when Wickard was the last word on the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, it seems less likely to gain traction now, once Lopez, Morrison, 
and Sebelius have narrowed the scope of interstate commerce. Yet, I assert this more 
recent line of cases does not close the door to the idea that the federal immigration 
power could be rooted in the Interstate Commerce Clause. Indeed, immigration law 
more easily falls within the restricted boundaries of the Commerce Clause announced 
in Lopez and Morrison than either guns near schools or gender-based crimes of 
violence. I rely on three points in reaching this conclusion. First, with regard to the 
category at issue in Lopez and Morrison, “whether the regulated activity 
‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce,”215 immigration is more fundamentally 
and directly an economic activity than guns near schools or violence against women. 
In addition, and critically, immigration does not raise the specter of federal 
infringement on traditional arenas of state action that so clearly preoccupied the 
Court in those two cases. Finally, separate and apart from the argument that 
immigration substantially affects commerce, it should also be considered within an 
additional category announced by Rehnquist in Lopez: the regulation of “persons or 
things in interstate commerce.”216 
Regarding the link between commercial activity and the target of the regulation, 
in Lopez and Morrison, Justice Rehnquist rejects what he terms the “‘costs of crime’ 
and ‘national productivity’ arguments”217 offered about the impact of guns near 
schools and violence against women on the economy. He characterizes them as “but-
for reasoning” that would open the doors to federal regulation of just about anything, 
including in spheres traditionally reserved to the states.218 For immigration, however, 
there is a strong case to be made that the regulated activity is itself economic, with 
no causal arguments necessary. Again, immigrants are usually economic actors 
whether or not their visa is granted under an employment category.219 No less than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. See supra note 15. 
 215. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 216. Id. at 558. 
 217. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000). 
 218. Id. at 613. 
 219. Also, recall that the test is not whether the challenged activities affect commerce, but 
could Congress have so concluded. “We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22(2005) (citing 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). “That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no 
moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of 
that larger scheme.” Id. 
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those who enter after being sponsored by an employer, refugees and those who are 
admitted as siblings of citizens must work.220 There are exceptions, of course, but 
they do not undermine Congress’s authority to regulate immigration under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. As the Supreme Court has stated “where a general 
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character 
of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”221 
Second, immigration presents quite a different picture as to the concern in both 
Lopez and Morrison that an expansive understanding of the Interstate Commerce 
Clause would encroach on traditional realms of state power. While education and 
criminal law have historically (although perhaps less exclusively than Justice 
Rehnquist would have it) been governed by the states, immigration is a traditional 
subject of federal regulation.222 To declare that the power to regulate immigration 
derives from the Commerce Clause would not change the 180-year understanding 
that immigration is fundamentally an area of federal control.223 In that sense, the 
immigration-as-interstate-commerce argument poses little threat to the established 
boundaries between the state and the federal, the policing of which motivates the 
Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison. Rather, it would tie an area of admittedly 
federal control more closely to the Constitution, a development that would seem 
normatively allied with Justice Rehnquist’s emphasis in Morrison that “[e]very law 
enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution.”224 
Third, while in Lopez and Morrison the Court analyzed the law at hand under only 
one of the three potential categories of Commerce Clause regulation announced in 
Lopez—that related to “‘substantial effect[s]’ on interstate commerce”225—in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. On refugees, see my arguments in Jennifer Gordon, Refugees as Low-Wage Workers, 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 221. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled on other grounds by 
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 222. See supra Part I. 
 223. None of this is to imply that all regulation affecting immigrants is reserved to the 
federal government. The states have always retained their police powers with regard to 
governing immigrants, even as the scope of those powers has been interpreted differently over 
time. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 641 F.3d 
339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 
(1976); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). There is a rich literature on 
immigration federalism exploring the boundary between state and federal powers over 
immigration, particularly in the context of active state and local efforts over the past two 
decades to either protect immigrants from federal enforcement of immigration law or to enact 
measures more restrictive than federal immigration law. See, e.g., PRATHEEPAN 
GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); 
Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 577 (2012); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration 
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism 
Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007). 
 224. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). 
 225. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557, 559–60 (1995); see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 611. 
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case of immigration, another of the options offers a distinct basis. A separate category 
announced in Lopez includes regulation of “persons or things in interstate commerce, 
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”226 Immigrants 
would seem to fit this description. They not only are more active in the labor market 
than natives but are more mobile between states in response to changes in demand. 
Recent studies of interstate migration in response to the Great Recession affirm the 
assertion of Harvard economist George Borjas some years ago that “immigration 
greases the wheels of the labor market by injecting into the economy a group of 
persons who are very responsive to regional differences in economic 
opportunities.”227 This argument is bolstered by the impact of immigrants on the state 
and national economies noted above. 
Thus, under the test announced in Lopez and Morrison, there are viable arguments 
that the Interstate Commerce Clause can undergird the federal government’s 
immigration power. Post-Raich, however, to advance the position that immigration 
falls under the Interstate Commerce Clause, one must also contend that the regulation 
of the economic and noneconomic aspects of immigration are together part of an 
indivisible scheme.228 In other words, removing control over labor migration from 
the immigration statute would leave behind a scheme that was incoherent and/or still 
had an impact on interstate commerce.229 
This is a fairly straightforward argument to make. To excise the temporary and 
permanent employment visa categories from the statute would not be sufficient to 
separate out labor migration because the eleven million undocumented workers in 
the United States are largely labor migrants. (In this context, it is worth noting that 
in the few cases that address the issue, most federal courts have found no impediment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 226. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 227. George J. Borjas, Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?, 2001 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 69, 70 (2001); Mark Ellis, Richard Wright & Matthew 
Townley, State-Scale Immigration Enforcement and Latino Interstate Migration in the United 
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 228. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (“One need not have a degree in economics 
to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) 
locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, 
and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this 
extraordinarily popular substance.”). 
 229. Immigration raises this question in a somewhat different way than Raich. In Raich, 
the question was whether severing the regulation of privately grown medical marijuana 
(asserted by the plaintiffs to be unrelated to commerce) from the larger federal scheme 
regulating drugs (which was assumed to have a relationship to commerce) would leave a 
coherent regulatory scheme behind or whether an exemption for the former would undermine 
the integrity of the latter. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 (framing the question as “whether Congress’ 
contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision to include this narrower ‘class of activities’ within 
the larger regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient.”). In the immigration context, the 
question is whether the regulatory scheme could coherently be divided in two: one part directly 
addressing labor migration and mobile immigrant workers in interstate commerce (assumed 
to be an economic phenomenon) and the other, larger part regulating immigration unrelated to 
commerce. In what follows, I argue that the two are not divisible because both relate to the 
impact of immigration on commerce and should be regulated together to create a coherent 
regulatory scheme. 
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to including undocumented immigrants within the scope of the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.230) Undocumented men have the highest labor-force participation rates of 
anyone in the United States: 91% as compared to 84% for legal immigrants and 79% 
for native workers.231 Measures regarding border and interior enforcement of 
immigration law thus would have to be removed from the statute as well. This would 
leave behind an immigration law without immigration control, which few would 
consider a coherent scheme of regulation. In addition, excising the explicitly labor-
related aspects of the statute—resulting in a law that sets terms for entry and 
continued presence of noncitizens only on the basis of family ties, refugee status, 
study, and other non-work-related factors—would not eliminate the direct impact of 
immigration on the U.S. labor market. As noted above, immigrants lawfully admitted 
through nonemployment categories work in large numbers.232 
If this argument proves persuasive, Raich then opens the door more widely to 
linking immigration to interstate commerce. In Raich, the Court reiterates a key 
aspect of the Wickard holding: “When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of 
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class,”233 even 
if some of the activity is purely local. In addition, the critical question is not whether 
the activity at issue “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce in fact, but only 
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”234 
There is no question that laws passed by Congress pursuant to its interstate 
commerce authority can be subject to judicial review for constitutionality. Setting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. See, e.g., United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982). This is 
consistent with Commerce Clause jurisprudence about Congress’s power to regulate other 
kinds of illegal economic activity. See, e.g.,Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. But see United States v. 
Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11405085, at *9 (D. Ariz. Dec 10, 2010) (in 
the context of deciding defendant Arizona’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the argument of 
plaintiff United States that “it is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause for Arizona to 
regulate the interstate movement of people who are not lawfully present in the United States.”). 
“Edwards is distinguishable because, in that case, the underlying conduct (being indigent) was 
not unlawful.” Id. 
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Addressing Future Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental 
Affairs, 114th Cong. 7, fig.3 (2015) (written testimony of Jeffrey S. Passel, Senior 
Demographer, Pew Research Center). The reverse is true, however, for undocumented women. 
Id. However, men make up the majority of the undocumented population. Ariel G. Ruiz, Jie 
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(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-women-united-
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 232. This focus on paid work is not meant to marginalize immigrants whose motive for 
migrating is noneconomic or those who are less likely to work for pay on arrival, such as 
mothers migrating with children, older adults migrating to be reunited with their families, and 
disabled people. My argument is that, in its totality, it is a better description of the impact of 
immigration to say that it is economic than to characterize it as a threat to sovereignty or 
national security. 
 233. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). “The CSA is a statute that regulates the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, 
and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 26. 
 234. Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)). 
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aside the Wickard-Lopez line of cases, which is about the extent of the commerce 
power itself, the Supreme Court is not infrequently called on to assess whether 
legislation that incontrovertibly falls under Congress’s interstate commerce authority 
nonetheless infringes on other constitutional provisions. In such situations, the Court 
has not hesitated to review the statute—and indeed to strike it down. The Supreme 
Court has stated clearly that “[c]ongressional enactments which may be fully within 
the grant of legislative authority contained in the [Interstate] Commerce Clause may 
nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to trial by jury 
contained in the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”235 The Tenth Amendment is another common source of challenge to 
government action under the Interstate Commerce Clause. In New York v. United 
States, for example, the Court held unconstitutional a provision of a federal law that 
required states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste within their own borders.236 
There was no assertion that the provision itself exceeded the scope of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. Instead, it was struck down because it conflicted with the Tenth 
Amendment by “commandeer[ing]” state governments in an arena where the 
Amendment reserved power to the states.237 
2. Discussion of Immigration as Interstate Commerce in Contemporary Case Law 
Paradoxically, the only contemporary case in which a circuit court considers 
whether congressional regulation of individual immigrants is tied to the Commerce 
Clause appears in a challenge not to an immigration law but to the Hobbs Act, which 
criminalizes robbery that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce “or the movement 
of any article or commodity in commerce.”238 In United States v. Hanigan, the 
government sought to use the Hobbs Act to prosecute a man who robbed and tortured 
three undocumented Mexican immigrants.239 The Act defines “commerce” as 
coextensive with the scope of the Commerce Clause.240 The defendant challenged 
the government’s prosecution and the underlying statute on the grounds that migrants 
were not articles of commerce, and even if they were, regulation impacting 
“undocumented alien laborers” fell outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976), overruled on other grounds 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 236. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 237. Id. at 176; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 238. United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The Hobbs Act 
makes it a federal crime to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce ‘or the movement of any article 
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1130. The court also cited Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173–74 (1941), noting that 
“intercourse” in the Commerce Clause includes the movement of persons. Id. See also Service 
Machine & Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1980), which struck 
down a registration fee imposed on all workers as a hindrance to migrant labor. 
 239. 681 F.2d at 1128–29. 
 240. Id. at 1129–30 (“As defined in the Act, commerce includes ‘all . . . other commerce 
over which the United States has jurisdiction.’”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2012)). 
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authority.241 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court noted that 
“[t]he statute by its terms does not limit ‘commerce’ to the flow of legally condoned 
articles. Nor could the [C]ommerce [C]lause itself mean that an activity to be 
regulated by Congress must be legally permissible.”242 The case holds that “the 
movement of undocumented alien laborers across a national boundary into this 
country is within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate [under the 
Commerce Clause].”243 
The few cases where immigration regulation itself has been discussed in relation 
to the Commerce Clause are all in lower courts, and only one of them touches on the 
questions just raised with regard to Lopez. In the context of recent litigation 
challenging state laws creating restrictions on immigrants, advocates—and, under 
the Obama administration, the government itself—attempted to advance the Dormant 
Commerce Clause argument that such laws impermissibly burden interstate and 
foreign commerce.244 In general, district courts have found this position unpersuasive 
as applied to the state laws under consideration. For example, the relationship 
between interstate commerce and immigration undergirded a Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis in the unreported 2010 opinion of the Arizona U.S. District Court 
considering the legality of Arizona’s “attrition through enforcement” law.245 The 
Solicitor General argued that the Arizona law—which created new state penalties for 
offenses ranging from transporting and hiring undocumented immigrants to making 
unlawful presence a state trespassing violation—“offends the Dormant Commerce 
Clause by restricting the interstate movement of aliens.”246 The district court agreed 
that “the regulation of immigration does have an impact on interstate commerce,”247 
but since the state law in question did not explicitly limit the entry of immigrants to 
Arizona, instead prohibiting conduct already banned by federal law, the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. Id. at 1129. 
 242. Id. at 1131  
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 244. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 
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 245. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. at 988. 
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policy organization, the Center for Immigration Studies, that undocumented immigrants will 
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drivers’ licenses, and medical care. The theory undergirded many state and local anti-
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THE ILLEGAL POPULATION, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (2006), 
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Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155 (2008). 
 246. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (citation omitted). 
 247. Id. 
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States failed to show that the Arizona law raised this concern.248 Higher courts 
declined to consider the Commerce Clause issue on appeal.249 
United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, a 1997 Southern District of California case 
in which a noncitizen with a record of multiple deportations challenged the legality 
of provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act setting out the consequences 
for unlawful reentry following deportation,250 is the one published post-Lopez federal 
court decision to seriously consider whether the immigration power derives from the 
Commerce Clause. There, the court states plainly that  
[t]he fact that prior precedent recognizes Congress’s power over 
immigration as an incident of sovereignty does not signify that Congress 
could not regulate immigration under the auspices of one of its 
enumerated powers. Accordingly, even if Congress could not enact 
criminal immigration sanctions pursuant to the inherent power of a 
sovereign nation, § 1326 would still be constitutional as an exercise of 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.251 
The opinion goes on to assert that: 
[i]t is undeniable that the entry of foreign nationals could affect both 
foreign and interstate commerce. Indeed, one can assume that many 
individuals enter the United States illegally because of their desire to find 
better economic opportunities here. Such individuals provide both an 
inexpensive source of foreign labor, and a market for domestic goods and 
services, thereby affecting both interstate and foreign commerce.252 
Having decided that immigration is tied to the commerce power, the court then 
rejects the contention that in this instance Congress exceeded the boundaries set forth 
in Lopez. 
‘[T]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially 
affect any sort of interstate commerce.’ In the present case, however, the 
illegal entry of foreign nationals after deportation does substantially 
affect interstate commerce. Moreover, individuals who enter the country 
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Court’s decision did not discuss the Commerce Clause argument. 
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illegally provide a source of labor, thereby constituting ‘persons or things 
in interstate commerce.’253 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on sovereignty grounds; it 
did not reach the commerce argument.254 
D. What Do We Get from Conceiving of Immigration as Commerce? 
1. Impact Overall 
If the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses were recognized as sources of the 
contemporary federal immigration authority, that power would have a far firmer 
anchor in the Constitution than it does under current jurisprudence. Of course, taking 
this step will not eliminate the plenary power doctrine in one fell swoop. The 
constitutional source of a particular governmental power is related to, but not the sole 
determinant of, the degree to which courts will review government action in that 
arena for violations of individual constitutional rights.255 Nor will it automatically 
divorce immigration questions from sovereignty or national security concerns. 
Whatever the source of the power, the government can always assert that any policy 
related to control over immigration implicates sovereignty, or that national security 
concerns motivate its promulgation of a particular policy, in an effort to persuade 
courts to give it room to operate unfettered.256 
With this in mind, this Article is pragmatic in its claims and its argument. Its goal 
is to counteract the reflexive assumption embedded in the plenary power doctrine’s 
tie to sovereignty and foreign affairs that all immigration law relates to foreign 
relations and/or national security. This assumption encourages judges to default to a 
position of deference without an actual inquiry about whether it is appropriate given 
the immigration policy in question.257 This Article seeks to build a stronger 
constitutional undergirding for the immigration power, one that reminds judges that 
in the main, immigration is an economic issue, and that there is no reason to deviate 
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702 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:653 
 
from ordinary standards of judicial review when faced with most claims about 
constitutional rights violations in the immigration context. 
A recognition that the Commerce Clause grounds the government’s immigration 
power has the potential to reorient the federal courts’ degree of constitutional 
analysis of immigration questions in several important ways. 
First, returning to the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of the government’s 
immigration authority ties modern immigration jurisprudence to the historical 
understanding of the immigration power adopted in the early immigration federalism 
cases. Those cases arose under the Foreign Commerce Clause and were about 
federalism—that is, whether the states or the federal government had the power to 
regulate immigration—rather than individual rights. Nonetheless, it is significant 
that, as it answered these federalism questions, the Supreme Court treated the 
immigration power as nonexceptional with regard to the Constitution. Although early 
immigration cases were not explicitly about the Interstate Commerce Clause, in 
deciding them, the justices often spoke of the power to regulate immigrants from 
abroad as having the same constitutional origin and limitations as the power to 
regulate migrants between states, reasoning that a holding about one would also 
apply to the other.258 This offers some indication that during the nineteenth century 
the Supreme Court did not contemplate that all uses of the immigration power would 
be subject to a more deferential standard of constitutional review. 
Second, the addition of the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the 
immigration power grounds that authority even more firmly in an arena without any 
carve-outs from constitutional oversight. As I note in Part III.B, although courts have 
explicitly held that government actions under the Foreign Commerce Clause are 
subject to constitutional constraints, there is a danger that locating immigration only 
in the foreign branch of the Commerce Clause might create echoes of foreign policy 
concerns requiring deference to the political branches. The Interstate Commerce 
Clause as a constitutional source of the immigration power signals that the 
government’s exercise of that authority arises from a power under which courts 
routinely review government actions for constitutionality. The default assumption is 
that a government action rooted in the Interstate Commerce Clause receives ordinary 
review in the face of a challenge to the action’s constitutionality. 
Finally, an immigration power that arises from the Commerce Clause highlights 
the economic nature of most immigration. It serves as a reminder that the vast 
majority of immigration law is about the daily management of a flow of noncitizens 
who contribute to the U.S. economy through tourism, investment, purchases, and 
labor. Most immigration statutes, regulations, and policies relate to routine matters 
of bureaucratic processing and management of this flow. Aspects of immigration law 
that do address national security or foreign affairs are generally contained in discrete 
statutory provisions, regulations, or policy documents that explicitly reference such 
concerns.259 The remaining majority of the federal government’s exercises of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 258. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 417 (Wayne, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the federal power to regulate the movement of human beings across borders 
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immigration power are grounded in the central concerns of the Commerce Clause. 
This insight offers an important counternarrative to the government’s repeated claims 
in litigation that foreign affairs and national security are the drivers of all aspects of 
immigration policy, and that immigration law as a whole should thus receive greater 
judicial deference. 
2. Impact on Constitutional Challenges to Different Classes of Immigration Policies 
Grounding the immigration power in the Commerce Clause is likely to have a 
different impact on judicial review depending on the nature of the underlying law 
being challenged. I will consider the effect of such a shift on three categories of 
immigration policies: those that are intended to regulate employment-related visas 
or otherwise address concerns about labor market competition; those that set general 
categories and procedures for admission and removal, unrelated to employment or 
to national security concerns; and those that specifically address foreign affairs or 
national security concerns. 
a. Immigration Policies Related to Employment and Labor Competition 
The arguments put forth in this Article are likely to have the greatest impact where 
plaintiffs challenge an aspect of immigration law or policy that directly regulates 
immigrant employment or that was enacted in response to labor market concerns. 
The latter category, I would argue, includes almost all provisions regulating 
undocumented immigrants. The Supreme Court has not infrequently asserted that 
immigration restrictions are motivated by the need to limit competition for work 
within the United States. In 1991, for example, in a case upholding the validity of a 
regulation requiring that the Attorney General bar unauthorized work as a bond 
condition for noncitizens in removal proceedings, a unanimous Court stated that 
protecting U.S. workers against displacement was an “established concern of 
immigration law.”260 Looking to past cases, the opinion noted, “We have often 
recognized that a ‘primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for 
American workers.’”261 
In the context of a constitutional challenge to an aspect of immigration law that 
sets out the routes through which noncitizens can enter the United States for the 
purposes of employment; or that penalizes unlawful entry, presence in the country 
without admission, or visa overstay; plaintiffs can trace the power to enact such a 
provision to the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses and the government’s 
acknowledged right to control the movement of noncitizen workers (by now clearly 
understood as “commerce”)262 across its borders. In recognizing this connection, the 
Court would be in line with longstanding interpretations of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause and the modern understanding of the Interstate Commerce Clause. While 
there is no question that regulating immigration to limit labor competition remains a 
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federal power, tying it to the Commerce Clause underscores the argument that 
challenges to such policies should be subject to ordinary levels of constitutional 
review. 
Ironically, the Chinese Exclusion Act itself—which supplied the occasion for the 
Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Commerce Clause as the constitutional source 
of the immigration power—is a paradigmatic example of an immigration law passed 
to regulate the labor market.263 The Act applied exclusively to Chinese “laborers,” 
not to most other categories of Chinese immigrants.264 In the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, Justice Fields explicitly recognized that fear of job competition was a key 
factor behind the passage of the statute.265 It is telling that in order to avoid reviewing 
the procedures laid out in the Act for compliance with due process requirements, the 
Court felt compelled to break with longstanding precedent anchoring the 
immigration power in the Commerce Clause and create a new doctrine of plenary 
power, constitutionally justified by the federal government’s control of sovereignty 
and foreign affairs. Had the case been understood as a challenge to a procedural 
aspect of legislation arising under the Commerce Clause, it would have been harder 
for the Court to hold that Congress’s actions were outside the scope of judicial review 
for constitutionality. 
b. Immigration Policies Not Related to Employment or National Security 
The middle category identified here consists of laws that set generally applicable 
substantive or procedural terms for admission or removal, with few, if any, special 
implications for national security or foreign affairs. This class of cases encompasses 
the majority of challenged immigration laws and policies. In such cases, the 
government does not argue that this specific law or policy is primarily motivated by 
national security or foreign policy concerns, although it may suggest that it could 
nonetheless have some impact on diplomacy.266 Instead, it advances the plenary 
power doctrine in general, contending that this should minimize or eradicate judicial 
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Alito’s dissent in Pereira, discussed supra in note 252. 
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review of immigration law for constitutionality without reference to whether the 
actual policy implicates sovereignty, foreign affairs, or national security.267 
The Supreme Court’s response to such arguments has been inconsistent. In recent 
years, the Court has moved between applying ordinary standards of constitutional 
review (often without rejecting or refuting the plenary power doctrine), and applying 
the plenary power doctrine and deferring to the government. In cases where it does 
the former, it has de-emphasized the idea that the immigration power is rooted in 
sovereignty—but has not offered an alternative constitutional source. In the latter 
cases, it has leaned heavily on the sovereignty anchor. In this category, consistent 
recognition of the link between the immigration power in the Commerce Clause 
would serve to counterbalance the government’s assertion of plenary power, 
anchoring the government’s authority in an ordinary constitutional power that has 
not developed pockets of exemption from judicial review. 
A twenty-first century trio of Supreme Court cases on the detention of noncitizens 
during or after removal proceedings offers an illustration of this inconsistency 
problem and suggests the potential stabilizing impact of tying the immigration power 
to the Commerce Clause. The cases are Zadvydas v. Davis, decided less than three 
months before September 11, 2001 (“9/11”),268 Demore v. Kim, issued nineteen 
months after,269 and Jennings v. Rodriguez,270 decided by the Court in 2018. All fall 
within this middle category: they address due process challenges to aspects of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act that relate to the detention of noncitizens during or 
after the conclusion of deportation proceedings,271 with no reference to employment, 
undocumented immigration, or foreign affairs. Indeed, in none of the cases did the 
Court find that national security or foreign policy concerns motivated the statutory 
provision at issue. 
In Zadvydas, although the government asserted that the plenary power doctrine 
required the Court to defer to Congress’s decision to permit indefinite detention of 
noncitizens pending removal, the Court disagreed. It held that indefinite detention of 
deportable noncitizens beyond the time when removal was reasonably foreseeable 
was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.272 In deciding the case, the Court 
recognized the “primary Executive Branch responsibility”273 in the immigration area, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 267. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 
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which “require[s] courts to listen with care”274 to the government’s arguments. But 
the Court took note of the absence of any national security concerns in the case before 
it,275 and considered and rejected the government’s assertion that its interpretation of 
the statute to permit indefinite detention implicated foreign policy concerns.276 The 
majority’s conclusion that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien 
would raise a serious constitutional problem”277 grew from an essentially ordinary 
substantive and procedural due process analysis. Notably, the opinion did not once 
mention the source of the immigration power, or even use the word “sovereignty” in 
its opinion. 
In Demore v. Kim, the issue before the Court was whether the government could 
mandatorily detain all noncitizens pending deportation proceedings on certain 
grounds (for example, because they had committed certain crimes), without any 
individualized determination of flight risk or danger to the community.278 Here, with 
the country still on high alert less than two years after 9/11, the Court took a very 
different approach to reviewing the statute for constitutionality. The government did 
not allege that the challenged policy was motivated by or impacted foreign relations 
or national security. Yet in deciding the case, the Court tied the federal government’s 
immigration authority to foreign relations and the war power,279 and emphasized 
Cold War cases where immigration provisions were upheld under plenary power to 
protect the country from Communism,280 thus waving the flag in a way that implicitly 
suggested a link between the routine provision at issue and the need to protect 
national security. It then relied on the plenary power doctrine to reach the conclusion 
that the mandatory detention policy did not violate due process, despite the holding 
in Zadvydas.281 
After Demore v. Kim was decided, several circuits found that once a noncitizen 
had been detained for some time pending the conclusion of proceedings, a bond 
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  While acknowledging that the government traditionally is held to higher 
constitutional standards in proceedings for deporting a noncitizen, as here, than for excluding 
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as in Zadvydas. See Letter from the Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Solicitor Gen., to the 
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https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT2L-EG5G]; 
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, ll. 20–21, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 
(2016) (No. 15-1204) (Acting Solicitor General, for the government, in response to a question 
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hearing was mandatory to avoid due process concerns.282 The Second and Ninth 
Circuits followed the reasoning in Zadvydas and imposed a six-month limit on 
detention before an individualized bond hearing must be held.283  
The Supreme Court granted cert in Jennings v. Rodriguez to resolve the circuit 
split,284 and many hoped that the Court would clarify its view of the plenary power 
doctrine in its decision.   During oral argument on Rodriguez, the government opened 
with a strong statement of the doctrine.285 A majority of justices responded with 
skepticism that the Constitution permitted lengthy periods of detention without 
opportunity for a bond hearing pending the outcome of a removal proceeding.286 
Neither the litigants nor the Justices mentioned the constitutional source of the 
immigration power. In its 2018 decision, however, the Court did not squarely address 
the constitutionality of mandatory detention in this context. Instead, it held that in 
requiring a bond hearing at six months, the Ninth Circuit had impermissibly applied 
the constitutional avoidance doctrine to rewrite, rather than interpret, the relevant 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.287 The Court remanded the case 
for an explicit holding on the constitutional question.288 The issue is thus likely to 
return to the Court’s docket in the future. 
A comparison between Zadvydas and Demore illustrates the Court’s tendency to 
ignore the question of the constitutional grounding of the immigration power when 
it is inclined to undertake ordinary constitutional review, but to return to the line of 
cases rooting the immigration power in sovereignty when it defers to the 
government—even, and perhaps especially, when the provision or policy being 
challenged raises no specific foreign policy or national security issues. The result is 
an incoherent doctrine, leaving the relationship of immigration law to the 
Constitution (in terms of both power and rights) subject to change with the political 
mood. If the source of the immigration power is important in one case, it is important 
in all. 
Recognition of the Commerce Clause as an anchor of the immigration power 
would put the Court on a path to developing a constitutional jurisprudence for 
immigration law that consistently identifies the source of the immigration authority, 
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and applies ordinary constitutional review unless there is an additional reason 
(beyond the fact that the law relates to the entry or departure of noncitizens) for 
deference. 
c. Immigration Policies Related to Foreign Affairs and National Security 
The third class of cases are those challenging aspects of immigration law that 
explicitly address national security and foreign affairs, or those that the government 
asserts were primarily motivated by such concerns. Where the government responds 
to a constitutional challenge to an immigration policy by making an assertion that 
the policy implicates security or foreign policy, the obstacle to judicial review of 
rights is twofold. First is the plenary power presumption of deference for all federal 
immigration actions. Second, both foreign affairs and national security have their 
own deference doctrines, independent of immigration. 
As to the first obstacle, scholars have suggested that the appropriate judicial 
response to the government’s assertion that the immigration policy in question 
implicates national security and foreign affairs would be a meaningful inquiry into 
whether the policy actually is based on or meaningfully affects such concerns.289 In 
this they seek to adapt the holding of Baker v. Carr, a 1962 case regarding a challenge 
to redistricting, to the immigration context.290 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court 
made clear that it would not find a question to be political (and therefore beyond the 
scope of its review for constitutionality) simply because it arose, as this one did, in 
the context of politics. In reaching this conclusion, the Court summarized its 
jurisprudence on the justiciability of issues related to foreign relations,291 asserting 
that 
[o]ur cases in this field [foreign relations] seem invariably to show a 
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the 
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility 
to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific 
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action.292 
Stephen Legomsky and others contend that courts should undertake a similar 
assessment before determining that a particular immigration policy should be 
reviewed deferentially because it implicates foreign affairs and national security.293 
If the government demonstrates to the courts’ satisfaction that an actual risk to 
national security motivated the particular immigration policy, constitutional rights 
arguments would then face the challenges growing from independent traditions of 
deference to the political branches on questions of security and foreign affairs. 
Although a full examination of the arguments is beyond the scope of this Article, 
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suffice it to note that, like plenary power, these deference doctrines have critics of 
their own.294 
Exchanges between judges and litigants in the context of challenges to the first 
iteration of President Trump’s Executive Order suggested that at least some federal 
judges were inclined to look behind the government’s assertions. For example, 
during oral argument regarding the propriety of a nationwide temporary restraining 
order on the Order, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington Judge 
Robart responded to the administration’s argument that he should not question the 
Order since it was justified by the President’s assessment of a national security risk 
by stating, “I’m . . . asked to look and determine if the Executive Order is rationally 
based. And rationally based to me implies that to some extent I have to find it 
grounded in facts as opposed to fiction.”295 Judge Robart then ruled against the 
President, issuing the temporary restraining order.296 The Ninth Circuit upheld his 
decision.297 Such colloquies, and a number of the lower court opinions on the various 
iterations of the travel ban, model the sort of meaningful inquiry regarding national 
security considerations that should be more widespread when the government asserts 
that they are the motivation for its actions in the immigration arena. 
In Trump v. Hawaii, however, the Supreme Court demonstrated its reluctance to 
engage in such a process.  The majority asserted that it was applying rational basis 
review to the plaintiffs’ claims that the President’s travel ban was intended to exclude 
Muslims and thus violated the Establishment Clause.298 Yet the Court took an already 
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minimalist rational basis standard,299 and watered it down further.  The third version 
of the Executive Order must be upheld, the Court asserted, because “[i]t cannot be 
said [of the president’s action] that it is impossible to ‘discern a relationship to 
legitimate state interests’ or that the policy is ‘inexplicable by anything but 
animus.’”300 The majority reached this conclusion only after sidelining as 
“extrinsic”301 the President’s biased assertions about Muslim countries, individuals, 
and the religion as a whole, both before and after his election. Once it refused to 
consider these statements, the Court had a clear road ahead to reaching the conclusion 
that the order did not violate the Constitution.   
With Trump v. Hawaii as precedent, and a strong conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court for years to come, it seems unlikely that the Court will be abandoning 
the plenary power doctrine in the context of immigration policies with asserted 
national security implications any time soon.  As to other immigration cases, 
however, there is more hope. At base, most immigration law is about economic 
relationships between nations and within the United States. An immigration power 
anchored in the Commerce Clause would offer a counterweight to the tendency of 
courts to engage in only limited constitutional review of actions taken by Congress 
and the Executive Branch on immigration matters. It would signal that, as a whole, 
the exercise of the immigration authority is ordinarily subject to ordinary judicial 
review. It would encourage courts to hold plenary power inapplicable when they 
found that the policy in question did not, in fact, threaten national security or 
implicate important aspects of foreign policy, rather than deferring to the 
government’s routine assertion that it should always be free to act as it sees fit in the 
immigration arena, because the power is rooted in its constitutional control over 
sovereignty, and because all immigration law is an issue of foreign policy. 
3. The Same End by Different Means? 
Could the Supreme Court achieve a more normalized jurisprudence of 
immigration in relation to constitutional rights without holding that immigration 
power is derived from the Commerce Clause? As other scholars have noted, there 
are alternative routes to the outcome this Article seeks.302 Most recently, in 
Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” Matthew Lindsay argues that courts should 
disaggregate the interests implicated by various immigration laws, “and recognize 
both federal and state regulation of noncitizens for what it is: a variegated 
conglomeration of laws and enforcement actions that concern labor, crime, public 
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health and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and national security.”303 He calls 
for ordinary constitutional review of all immigration law except aspects that actually 
relate to security and foreign policy.304 
But to disaggregate immigration law, without disaggregating our understanding 
of the origins of the immigration power, only goes half way. As long as the 
immigration power remains understood as principally derived from national 
sovereignty and foreign affairs, the default will remain a thumb on the scale in favor 
of judicial abdication of constitutional review no matter what the challenged policy. 
Others have argued that the courts should, and indeed already often do, apply 
ordinary statutory interpretation principles in order to avoid reaching constitutional 
questions, propose a burden shift that would require the government to demonstrate 
an actual impact on foreign affairs or national security, or make frontal attacks on 
the concept of sovereignty or the origins and coherence of the foreign affairs 
power.305 Similarly, what would anchor those changes? Without a clear, new 
articulation of the source of the constitutional power, the level of review of 
immigration policy for constitutional violations will remain untethered, leaving it 
vulnerable to drift with the political winds. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison that it was the role of 
federal courts to review all legislation for constitutionality, it did not exempt 
immigration from its scope. Nor is there an immigration loophole in the doctrine of 
enumerated powers. Yet for the past century and a quarter, the Supreme Court has 
rooted the immigration authority in a tenuous series of implications from 
constitutional powers, and has repeatedly (if, of late, inconsistently) used that 
reasoning to justify abdicating constitutional review of immigration law. The impact 
of this approach on constitutional rights in the immigration context has been 
devastating. 
Plenary power was created by the Supreme Court in 1889 to cloak rank, racial 
prejudice, fears about economic competition, and xenophobia in the vaunted 
garments of sovereignty and foreign affairs. Today, immigration law in its vast 
majority has nothing to do with foreign policy. The core questions that arise in the 
field are about creating fair, rational, and efficient procedures to carry out the work 
of a bureaucracy whose decisions touch tens of millions of lives a year in every nation 
around the globe, with a direct impact on the U.S. labor market. 
The task of modernizing and constitutionalizing federal court review of 
immigration policy is complicated by the fact that no one aspect of the Constitution 
covers all facets of immigration. Cognizant of that challenge, this Article has 
advanced the argument that, in many circumstances, the federal government’s 
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authority to control immigration can be understood as derived from the Foreign and 
Interstate Commerce Clauses. 
Courts have made clear that the Foreign Commerce Clause grants Congress a 
“plenary power”—but, unlike the immigration power rooted in foreign affairs and 
sovereignty, one subject to judicial review for constitutionality. The Supreme Court 
has never disavowed the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of the immigration 
power. It remains available to modern litigants and courts. Given the large number 
of immigrants in the U.S. labor market, their interstate mobility, and the more 
capacious standard for what constitutes “interstate commerce” today as opposed to a 
century ago, there are strong arguments that the Interstate Commerce Clause is also 
available to undergird the federal government’s immigration authority. 
Some scholars would respond that a “dramatic new reading of the Constitution”306 
is not necessary to cure the constitutional outlier status of immigration law wrought 
by the plenary power doctrine. They would point out that in some, although not all, 
recent cases, the Supreme Court appears to be quietly moving away from 
immigration exceptionalism. The Court should be left in peace, they might say, to 
apply ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, administrative law, and—on rare 
occasions—constitutional review to laws about entry and removal, as it sees fit, 
without the upheaval that would attend overruling plenary power. 
This Article asserts by contrast that plenary power must be explicitly rejected, not 
just pushed to the back of the shelf. Otherwise, it will remain ripe for revival when 
national anxiety about immigration runs high and the political branches take action 
against immigrants in ways that threaten core constitutional values. In its stead, the 
Commerce Clause offers a coherent source of the federal government’s immigration 
authority that can undergird broader constitutional review of many congressional and 
executive actions in the immigration arena.  
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